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The economic determinants of conditional conservatism 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We study the economic determinants of conditional conservatism. Consistent with prior 
literature, we find that contracting induces only conditional conservatism and litigation induces 
both conditional and unconditional conservatism. We extend prior evidence by Qiang (2007) by 
showing that taxation and regulation induce not only unconditional conservatism, but conditional 
conservatism as well. We show that in certain scenarios taxation and regulation create incentives 
to shift income from periods with high taxation pressure and high public scrutiny to periods with 
lower taxation pressure and lower public scrutiny. These income shifting strategies are 
implemented by recognising current economic losses that, given managerial incentives to report 
aggressively, would not have been recognised otherwise, or by delaying the recognition of 
current economic gains that would have been recognised had circumstances been different. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
There is scarce empirical evidence and mixed views on which are the economic determinants of 
conservatism in accounting and what types of conservatism they trigger. Watts (2003) identifies 
four main triggering factors for conservatism: contracting, litigation, taxation and regulation. 
Ball (2001), Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Basu (2005) similarly point at these factors as 
being the main determinants of conservatism in accounting. However, in the spirit of Beaver and 
Ryan (2005), these authors theorize that each of these determinants likely creates incentives for 
only one out of two separate types of conservatism: either (1) for ex-ante, news-unrelated or 
unconditional conservatism, or (2) for ex-post, news-related or conditional conservatism.  
There is some consensus in the existing literature that contracting and litigation induce 
conditional conservatism, defined by Basu (1997) as the existence of stronger verification 
requirements for the recognition of economic gains than for the recognition of economic losses, 
generating earnings that reflect bad news in a timelier fashion than good news. Regarding 
taxation and regulation, Ball (2001), Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Basu (2005) argue that 
they likely induce only conservatism in its unconditional form, which implies that “aspects of the 
accounting process determined at the inception of assets or liabilities yield expected unrecorded 
goodwill” (Beaver and Ryan, 2005: 269). Recent empirical research on the determinants of 
conservatism by Qiang (2007) finds evidence consistent with contracting triggering conditional 
conservatism, litigation triggering both conditional and unconditional conservatism, and taxation 
and regulation triggering only unconditional conservatism. 
 In this paper, we revisit the issue of whether conditional conservatism varies with 
contracting, litigation, taxation and regulation. In particular, we re-examine whether regulation 
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and taxation can also induce conditional conservatism. While we agree that unconditional 
conservatism, as a long-run accounting policy, helps managers to minimize tax payments and 
that standard setters and other regulators likely have a preference for a stronger form of 
conservatism such as the unconditional form, to avoid blame from constituents, we argue that 
managers also face tax-related and political costs-related incentives to report conditionally 
conservative numbers. 
Regarding taxation, the decrease in the net present value of tax payments that Watts 
(2003) puts forward as an explanation to why managers implement conservative accounting 
practices, can be achieved: (1) by delaying tax payments through unconditional conservatism, 
i.e., via the persistent understatement of net assets, and (2) by shifting income from periods with 
high marginal tax rates to periods with low marginal tax rates. Unconditional conservatism is not 
an efficient tool to shift income across periods as it lacks flexibility, and current understatements 
translate into net income overstatements in future periods when marginal tax rates may be higher 
for the specific firm, or for all firms, if statutory tax rates increase. Managers choosing to shift 
income across periods will resort to either recognising current economic losses on a very timely 
basis, or to delaying the recognition of current economic gains to future periods with lower 
marginal tax rates (or to both strategies), to reduce current income. Thus, high marginal tax rates 
will decrease managers’ incentives for aggressive earnings management practices and will 
contribute to increase conditional conservatism.  
With respect to regulation, standard setters and other regulators enforce a certain degree 
of unconditional conservatism by imposing accounting standards that are based on historical 
cost, that do not allow the capitalization of R&D costs, etc. However, the unconditional 
conservatism resulting from these regulatory demands does not shield firms and managers from 
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political costs and regulatory scrutiny. Managers still have incentives to use the remaining 
flexibility within accounting standards to reduce political costs, by shifting income from periods 
with high political visibility and high expected political costs to periods with low political 
visibility and low expected political costs. As with taxation, to lower political visibility, 
managers will reduce earnings through the timely recognition of current economic losses, or 
through lower aggressiveness in recognising current economic gains.  
Qiang’s (2007) result of no association between conditional conservatism and taxation or 
regulation is attributable to the use of empirical proxies to measure tax pressures and regulation 
costs that fail to capture the scenarios described above (situations where the firm faces a high 
current marginal tax rate or high current political visibility) where managers have incentives to 
shift income across periods, and where conditional conservatism can be an efficient tool to 
achieve this objective. 
Applying the model proposed by Basu (1997) to a large sample of US firms for the 
period 1964 to 2005, we conduct a simple test to analyse the effect of each of these four 
conditional conservatism triggering factors on an individual basis. First, we show that 
conditional conservatism is positively associated to several proxies for contracting incentives to 
use conservative numbers. Second, we find that litigation risk, as measured by a firm-specific 
proxy designed to capture time-series variation in litigation exposure, induces conditional 
conservatism and that, consistent with Qiang, firm-specific proxies of litigation risk are 
associated with unconditional conservatism. Third, our results are consistent with taxation 
pressures that create incentives to shift income across periods (to minimize tax payments) 
inducing conditional conservatism, while book-tax conformity proxies capturing tax pressures 
that do not particularly change over time are associated with unconditional conservatism. Finally, 
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regulation pressures as measured by time-series economy-wide proxies induce conditional 
conservatism; while firm-specific regulation pressures reflecting high market-shares, which tend 
to be stable over time, induce unconditional conservatism. 
As an additional test, we create 247 portfolios of firm-year observations, according to the 
aggregate exposure to the four economic determinants of conditional conservatism and to the 
presence of unconditional conservatism. We expect that firms in the portfolio with the higher 
probability of conservative accounting choices –as denoted by high exposure to all four factors– 
will present more conditionally conservative earnings. Our results are consistent with this 
expectation: firms with higher joint exposure to these factors exhibit a higher level of conditional 
conservatism. Finally, we also show that firms where unconditional conservatism plays a 
substantive role show less pronounced conditional conservatism. This is consistent with the 
argument in Beaver and Ryan (2005) that unconditional conservatism pre-empts conditional 
conservatism.  
Our study expands previous empirical research by Qiang (2007) by showing that taxation 
and regulation also induce conditional conservatism. Specifically, our results show that managers 
respond to increases in tax-related and political cost-related pressures by increasing conditional 
conservatism. In addition, we improve on Qiang’s measures by constructing proxies for the 
economic determinants of conditional conservatism that combine time-series and cross-sectional 
variation. Her proxies are firm-specific averages over her sample period, and thus, cannot 
capture temporal variation. We also show that, in agreement with the arguments in Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005), contracting generates only a demand for conditional conservatism. 
Consistent with Qiang, we find that litigation risk induces both conditional and unconditional 
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conservatism. Finally, we provide a very simple and intuitive joint-test of the factors that drive 
the demand for conditional conservatism. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we explain the expected 
association between conditional conservatism and the four economic determinants: contracting, 
litigation, taxation and political costs. Section 3 describes the research design. Section 4 
discusses the results and robustness checks. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the main findings of 
the paper and the implications of our results for subsequent research on conservatism. 
2. THE DETERMINANTS OF CONDITIONAL CONSERVATISM 
Prior research on conservatism points out four main explanations for the existence of voluntary 
conservative practices (Watts, 2003): (i) contracting, (ii) litigation risk, (iii) taxation, and (iv) 
political costs. Conservative accounting numbers are achieved, as shown by Beaver and Ryan 
(2005) through two channels. First, firms report conservative numbers unconditionally by 
recording assets at a value that is lower than their economic value, or not capitalising them at all. 
Examples are the non-recognition of internally generated intangible assets, the use of historic 
cost accounting or the use of depreciation/amortization rates in excess of economic depreciation 
that creates unrecorded goodwill. Second, firms report conditionally conservative accounting 
numbers when they use different verifiability criteria to recognise economic gains and losses in 
the income statement (Basu, 1997). Conditional conservatism exists when economic losses are 
recognized in the income statement faster than economic gains. 
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 In this section we describe how contracting, litigation, taxation and political costs 
contribute to the existence of conditional conservatism.1 We argue that contracting induces only 
conditional conservatism, while litigation, taxation and political costs induce both conditional 
and unconditional conservatism. Prior research by Ball (2001), Ball and Shivakumar (2005), 
Basu (2005) and Qiang (2007) argues that taxation and political costs are likely to induce 
conservatism only in its unconditional form. We show that, under certain circumstances, taxation 
pressures and political costs also generate incentives to report conditionally conservative 
earnings numbers. 
(i) Contracting incentives 
Recent work by Holthausen and Watts (2001), Watts (2003), Guay and Verrecchia (2006) and 
Ball, Robin and Sadka (2008) concurs in pointing out debt contracting as the main economic 
determinant of conditionally conservative reporting. In general, the value of debt claims is more 
sensitive to decreases than to increases in firm value. Consequently, debt contracts treat gains 
and losses asymmetrically (Ball et al., 2008; Beatty, Weber and Yu, 2008). Because economic 
losses decrease the value of debt, lenders protect themselves against loss-making managers by 
introducing covenants into debt contracts that permit restricting major decisions that further 
decrease the value of the outstanding debt and that reduce the probability that the creditors will 
see their investment returned (such as excessive cash payouts in the form of dividends, new 
acquisitions or borrowings.)  
                                                 
1 We assume that most of the variation in conditional conservatism is caused by firms’ choices in response to these 
drivers. Accounting standard-setters are likely to respond to these same economic forces by enacting the demanded 
accounting standards. In turn, firms respond by making choices within the accepted set of GAAP to achieve the 
desired level of conditional conservatism. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this insight. 
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 Debt contracts are commonly written in terms of variables reported in the financial 
statements, such as interest coverage or financial leverage. Conservative accounting facilitates 
the monitoring of these contracts, improving the efficiency of contracting ex-ante by providing 
lenders with information that permits writing the terms of the loan more efficiently, and ex-post 
by triggering debt-covenant violations faster (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005). Timely covenant 
violation thus becomes an efficient mechanism for lenders to exercise their contractual rights and 
restrict decisions by loss-making managers that could further erode debt quality (Ball et al., 
2008). In addition, conditionally conservative accounting limits the available opportunities for 
successful manipulation of the reported variables included in debt contracts to expropriate the 
lenders. Thus, it is predicted that debt holders will demand conditionally conservative earnings.  
Supporting this prediction, recent work by Ball et al. (2008) finds a positive association 
between conditional conservatism and the size of international debt markets. Additionally, 
Ahmed et al. (2002) show that more conservative firms benefit from a lower cost of debt, 
consistent with debt-holders rewarding firms that use more conservative accounting by 
demanding a lower rate of return. Put together, this evidence is consistent with debt-holders 
demanding conservative accounting numbers. We are not aware of the existence of any previous 
study directly addressing firm-level variation in conditional conservatism due to debt contracting 
and the debt covenant provisions included in those contracts.  
In addition to debt contracting, Basu (1997) and Ball (2001) emphasize managerial 
contracting as a source of demand for conditional conservatism. Compensation contracts based 
to some extent on accounting numbers create incentives for aggressive accounting (Healy, 1985). 
This, in turn, generates investors’ demand for conditional conservatism to avoid expropriation. 
Investors will therefore require strong governance mechanisms that can enforce conservative 
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accounting choices. Recent evidence in Beekes, Pope and Young (2004), Ahmed and Duellman 
(2007) and García Lara, García Osma and Penalva (2007, 2008) confirms that stronger corporate 
governance is associated with increased conditional conservatism. 
(ii) Exposure to litigation risk 
Shareholder litigation is a significant source of conservatism, particularly, in recent years. The 
US is a highly litigious environment with a well-founded legal system, strong legal investor 
protection for creditors and shareholders (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and Shleifer, 1998, 1999), 
and low costs associated to naming public defendants (Stice, 1991; Ball, Kothari and Robin, 
2000; Khurana and Raman, 2004). Firm litigation risk arises when the different parties to the 
firm can sue (or can threaten to sue) managers, directors or auditors in an attempt to recover 
incurred losses by attributing them to defects in the financial statements, thereby assigning 
responsibility for the losses to accounting numbers not reflecting the true underlying economic 
performance of the firm.  
 Against this framework, conditional conservatism plays an important role in mitigating 
the negative effects of information asymmetries, reducing moral hazard, adverse selection and 
other agency problems, and thus, contributing to reduce litigation risk. The asymmetric 
recognition requirements for economic gains and losses are closely linked to asymmetries in the 
loss function of directors and auditors: overstating (understating) net assets or earnings is more 
(less) likely to generate litigation costs. Consistent with this view, extant research on auditor 
litigation shows that lawsuits against auditors are almost always related to situations where 
earnings or net assets have been overstated (Kellogg, 1984; St. Pierre and Anderson, 1984) or 
where the firm reports significant income-increasing abnormal accruals (Heninger, 2001).  
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Therefore, litigation risk produces asymmetric payoffs, and the assessment of these loss 
functions depends on the general legal environment or legal regime (Seetharaman, Gul and 
Lynn, 2002), i.e., on the extent to which the legal system allows small investors to sue the 
corporation, managers, directors or auditors, with the expectation that the outcome of the 
litigation process will favour the more vulnerable party (the investor). This assessment of 
litigation risk varies depending on changes in the severity of the legal environment and 
determines managerial, auditor and director’s effort to reduce expected liability loss payments. 
Empirical research on the association between litigation risk and conditional 
conservatism has analysed (1) whether there are differences in conditional conservatism between 
countries with diverging levels of litigation risk exposure; (2) whether conditional conservatism 
has varied historically in the US as a response to period changes in the overall levels of firms’ 
exposure to litigation risk; and (3) whether firm-level litigation induces both conditional and 
unconditional conservatism. In an international context, Ball et al. (2000) and Bushman and 
Piotroski (2006) show that in Anglo-Saxon common-law countries, where litigation risk is more 
pronounced, conditional conservatism measures are significantly larger than in countries where 
investors’ expected chances of successfully defending their interests over the firm in court are 
low. In addition, Ball, Robin and Wu (2003) also show that conditional conservatism across 
several common-law countries varies with litigation risk. Regarding the evolution of conditional 
conservatism over time in the US, evidence in Basu (1997) and Holthausen and Watts (2001) 
demonstrates that conditional conservatism has increased (decreased) whenever there has been 
an increase (decrease) in litigation risk. Finally, Qiang (2007) shows that firm-level proxies for 
litigation risk are associated to larger measures of both conditional and unconditional 
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conservatism, and Chung and Wynn (2008) demonstrate that managers can use conditional 
conservatism as insurance against litigation costs.  
Based on the prior arguments and results, we expect that conditional conservatism will 
vary with firms’ exposure to litigation risk. Even if unconditional conservatism increases as well 
with litigation risk, we expect that the increased use of unconditional conservatism does not 
completely exhaust managerial opportunities (and incentives) to increase conditional 
conservatism to further protect themselves from litigation exposure (Chung and Wynn, 2008). As 
managers, directors and auditors become increasingly concerned about potential lawsuits, they 
are expected to increase their demand for conditional conservative accounting choices 
(regardless of the initial stock of unconditional conservatism), increasing the timeliness of 
earnings to economic losses and delaying the recognition of difficult-to-verify economic gains. 
Thus, the higher the litigation risk, the higher the expected conditional conservatism. 
(iii) Tax sheltering to minimize tax payments 
Tax considerations affect financial accounting choices (Shackelford and Shevlin, 2001). Even 
though financial accounting and tax accounting often differ in a number of ways (for example, 
different revenue and expense recognition criteria), tax planning usually involves managerial use 
of accounting discretion to minimise the present value of tax payments. Both unconditional and 
conditional conservatism are used by managers as vehicles to reduce the present value of taxes 
and, thus, to increase firm value. Unconditionally conservative accounting anticipates the 
recognition of economic losses, which delays tax payments, irrespective of the current marginal 
tax rate faced by the firm. Therefore, the adoption of unconditionally conservative accounting 
policies lacks flexibility, as it cannot be used to reduce the value of tax payments by allocating 
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income to periods with lower marginal tax rates. Managers cannot respond in a timely manner to 
changes in their marginal tax rates using unconditionally conservative measures. Conditional 
conservatism is then used to shift current income across periods: from periods with high 
expected tax rates to periods with lower expected tax rates. This shifting of income reduces not 
only the net present value of tax payments, but the overall amount to be paid. Therefore, in a 
scenario where firms face greater tax pressures, it is less (more) costly to recognise current 
economic losses (gains) and thus, managerial incentives to report aggressively are reduced. 
 Tax avoidance (also referred to as tax-sheltering) is a widespread practice in US 
corporations (Desai and Dharmapala, 2006), particularly in large multinational companies (Rego, 
2003). Managers shift income across periods to minimize tax payments transitorily to circumvent 
changes in tax regulation ––as happened with the Tax Reform Act of 1986, that created 
incentives to shift income temporarily (Scholes, Wilson and Wolfson, 1992; Guenther, 1994)––, 
but also as a long-run strategy that managers maintain for long periods of time. In fact, recent 
evidence suggests that a significant number of firms succeed at keeping their effective tax rates 
low for periods of up to 10 consecutive years (Dyreng, Hanlon and Maydew, 2008), and that 
managers make use of the discretion inherent to accruals calculation to manage earnings 
downwards for tax purposes (Badertscher, Phillips, Pincus and Rego, 2006). Unconditional 
conservatism, implemented mainly through the direct expensing of certain costs (like R&D 
costs) and accelerated amortisation/depreciation of assets, is not flexible enough to successfully 
implement these income shifting strategies. It is more likely that managers will opt for 
recognizing economic losses that without the tax-driven income shifting incentives they would 
have disregarded. Examples of accruals that generate both book and tax deductions and give rise 
to conditional conservatism are increases in cost of goods sold (through the anticipation of 
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ending inventory write-offs), or increases in bad debt expense (through the anticipation of 
receivables write-offs). This is possible because determining when inventory or receivables 
become worthless is a judgment call. The anticipation of write-offs usually takes place in the 
fourth quarter so that the increase in cost of goods sold or in bad debt expense occurs in the same 
fiscal year as the recognition of the additional write-offs. This element of judgment provides 
firms with valuable discretion in the timing of both the book expense and the tax deduction (IRS 
Publications 535 and 538). Shackelford, Slemrod, and Salle (2007, pp. 31-32) state that “by 
timing the write-offs of receivables, the company may be able to maximize the tax savings from 
both operational losses and write-offs; they also gain discretion in the recognition of book 
income.”2  
 In addition, from a real operations management perspective, Badertscher et al. (2006) 
argue that managers also change firms’ operating activities to reduce both book income and 
taxable income and thus generate current tax benefits. Tax pressures are also expected to reduce 
the incentives for real earnings manipulation. Managers can reduce earnings in a book-tax 
conforming manner by not anticipating revenue recognition and not delaying real operating 
expenses, thereby reducing the present value of tax payments (for example, by accelerating their 
contribution to pension plans). Thus, we expect that the incentives to minimize tax payments 
through conditional conservatism will be higher as the firm tax pressure increases. 
(iv) Firm political costs 
Highly profitable firms draw attention from the media, employees, consumers, labour unions, 
and other pressure groups. These groups can translate this attention to regulators, lobbying for 
                                                 
2 See Northcut and Vines (1998) for additional examples of accruals that are high in book-tax conformity and a 
summary of prior research on how managers reduce book income to reduce tax costs. 
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the nationalization, expropriation, break-up or regulation of a specific industry or corporation. 
Regulators, in turn, may respond with new taxes, antitrust investigations, reductions in 
government subsidies or changes in price regulation. One of the three classic hypotheses of the 
influential positive accounting theory developed by Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1986) is that 
corporations and industries counter these potential government intrusions by choosing 
accounting methods that minimize current earnings to lower their public visibility and thus 
minimise political scrutiny (Cahan, 1992; Key, 1997).  
The existence of political costs is particularly true for regulated industries, where high 
reported profits are easily associated to monopoly rents. For industries where prices are 
regulated, high profitability is likely answered by regulators by imposing caps on prices. It is 
expected that in response to these pressures, managers attempt to minimize the likelihood of 
adverse political action by reducing their earnings. Thus, being exposed to high political costs 
(for example, pertaining to a regulated industry) generates incentives to engage in more 
pronounced conditional and unconditional conservative accounting choices.  
Accounting standards will impose a certain degree of unconditional conservatism (for 
example, demanding direct expensing of R&D costs). Given this compulsory level of 
unconditional conservatism, managers interested in achieving additional decreases in earnings to 
lower their visibility will recognise current economic losses that, given managers incentives to 
report aggressively, they would not have recognised otherwise, or they will delay the recognition 
of current economic gains that they would have recognised had circumstances been different. 
Empirical results in Jones (1991), Cahan (1992), Key (1997), Han and Wang (1998) and Navissi 
(1999) among others show that managers of firms under political scrutiny choose income 
decreasing strategies. This is consistent with managers shifting income from periods of high 
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political visibility to periods with reduced political visibility. These income decreasing strategies 
would enhance (reduce) the association between earnings and returns in bad (good) news 
periods, contributing to increase conditional conservatism as measured by Basu (1997). 
Qiang (2007) argues that regulators have a preference for unconditional versus 
conditional conservatism, because unconditional conservatism leads to smoother earnings and 
reduces the occurrence of large negative shocks, and that they (regulators) can drive managers 
into unconditionally conservative practices by imposing regulation costs on firms (restatements 
and SEC investigations). While we agree that accounting standard setters will induce 
unconditional conservatism, we also expect that regulators’ monitoring will provide managers 
with incentives for voluntarily fostering the recognition of bad news. In fact, we expect that the 
asymmetric loss function of regulators will create a demand for conditional conservatism. For 
example, in periods of economic downturn, regulators face significant public scrutiny and 
demands, whilst they do not attract similar attention in periods of economy-wide growth. In this 
context of increased public scrutiny, regulator pressures will likely translate into managers 
shifting income from periods of increased public scrutiny, to periods with lower public scrutiny. 
To lower their visibility managers will recognise current economic losses that, given their 
incentives to report aggressively, they would not have recognised otherwise, or they will delay 
the recognition of current gains that they would have recognised under lower political scrutiny. 
Besides, a large stock of unconditional conservatism is bound to reduce the asset base and lead to 
higher profitability as measured, for example, by the return-on-assets (ROA). Therefore, the 
incentives to report low profitability measures might trigger a trade-off between unconditional 
and conditional conservatism. Consistent with the view that regulation induces conditional 
conservatism, research by Sivakumar and Waymire (2003) demonstrates that the introduction of 
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tighter accounting standards together with rate regulation increased the conditionally 
conservative behaviour of early 20th century railroad firms. 
(v) Unconditional conservatism 
While conditional conservatism refers to how quickly the accounting system captures increases 
or decreases in wealth (assuming that conditional conservatism exists when decreases in wealth 
are captured faster than increases in wealth), unconditional conservatism involves the persistent 
understatement of net assets (through quicker amortization/depreciation or non-recognition). 
Unconditional conservatism is therefore independent of news. This is the case with the expensing 
(as opposed to capitalization and subsequent amortization) of R&D costs.  
 As argued by Giner and Rees (2001), Basu (2001), Pope and Walker (2003) and Beaver 
and Ryan (2005), unconditional conservatism pre-empts conditional conservatism. A firm not 
capitalizing R&D when the costs are incurred is more unconditionally conservative. A firm 
capitalizing R&D expenditures will subsequently amortize them, incurring in more pronounced 
conditional conservatism. However, the non-capitalizing firm, by being more unconditionally 
conservative, will appear to be less conditionally conservative in the future if compared to the 
capitalizing firm. This is so because possible bad outcomes of the research project will not affect 
the financial statements, as unrecognized assets cannot be written-off. Following Beaver and 
Ryan (2005), we expect that firms with high levels of unconditional conservatism will show less 
pronounced measures of conditional conservatism. Measuring unconditional conservatism is not 
a simple task. Recent research uses the market-to-book ratio (also a proxy for growth and risk), 
the C-Score proposed by Penman and Zhang (2002), the intercept of the Basu (1997) regression, 
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or the bias component developed by Beaver and Ryan (2000) as measures of unconditional 
conservatism. 
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This section provides a description of the procedures we follow to test the effect of the four 
identified economic determinants of conditional conservatism: (i) contracting; (ii) litigation risk; 
(iii) taxation; and (iv) political costs. Conditional conservatism is estimated from a Basu (1997) 
earnings-returns regression. We use several proxies for contracting, litigation, taxation and 
political costs. We expect all contracting proxies to be positively associated with conditional 
conservatism. Regarding litigation, taxation and regulation, we expect firm-level proxies with 
little time series variation to capture incentives for unconditional conservatism, while we expect 
proxies that vary over time to proxy for income-shifting incentives that induce conditional 
conservatism in accounting. 
(i) Empirical proxies of conditional conservatism 
Our proxy of conditional conservatism is based on Basu’s (1997) measure. Under conservative 
accounting, earnings capture bad news faster than good news because of the asymmetric 
standards of verification of losses and gains. Basu uses stock returns to proxy for good and bad 
news. Stock prices incorporate all the information arriving to the market from multiple sources, 
including reported earnings, in a timely fashion. Therefore, stock price changes are a measure of 
news arrival during the period. Because earnings are timelier in recognizing bad news than good 
news, Basu expects to find a higher association of earnings with negative returns (the bad news 
proxy) than with positive returns (the good news proxy). We use Basu’s regression as follows: 
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0 1 2 3t t t t t tX D R D Rβ β β β μ= + + + +               (1) 
where Xt is net income, deflated by the firm’s market value of equity at the beginning of the 
period.3 Rt is the annual stock rate of return of the firm, measured compounding twelve monthly 
CRSP stock returns ending three months after the last day of fiscal year t. Dt is a dummy variable 
that equals 1 in the case of bad news (negative or zero rate of return) and 0 in the case of good 
news (positive stock rate of return). The coefficient β3 measures the level of asymmetric 
timeliness —of conditional conservatism— and it is expected to be positive and significant.  
 Basu’s approach has been used by a large number of studies analysing how conditional 
conservatism varies with certain firm-specific characteristics and with the evolution of legal 
liability exposure over time, yielding economically sensible results, that is, finding more 
pronounced earnings asymmetric timeliness for samples where this was expected.4 Figure 1 
presents the time-evolution of the annual β3 coefficients obtained from the Basu market-based 
measure of conditional conservatism. Previous scholarly work in this area (Basu, 1997; 
Holthausen and Watts, 2001) identifies two periods of high auditor litigation risk in which higher 
conditional conservatism is expected: 1967 to 1975 and 1983 to 1995. The descriptive evidence 
in Figure 1 indicates that conditional conservatism as per Basu increases in these periods, as 
expected. Also, Figure 1 suggests that conditional conservatism increased in the recent Sarbanes-
Oxley (SOX) era (after 2001), which corroborates the hypothesis in Basu (1997) and indicates 
                                                 
3 We replicate our main tests using earnings before extraordinary items and discontinued operations. Results and 
inferences remain unchanged. 
4 See, for example, Pope and Walker (1999), Ball et al. (2000), Givoly and Hayn (2000), Giner and Rees (2001), 
Basu, Hwang and Jan (2001), Ball et al. (2003), Ryan and Zarowin (2003), Raonic, McLeay and Asimakopoulos 
(2004), Beekes et al. (2004), García Lara, García Osma and Mora (2005), Huijgen and Lubberink (2005), Gassen, 
Fulbier and Sellhorn (2006), Bushman and Piotroski (2006), Roychowdhury and Watts (2007), Ball et al. (2008), 
LaFond and Watts (2008) and García Lara et al. (2008) among others. 
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that the Basu measure correctly picks up changes in conditional conservatism despite recent 
published criticism.5 
(ii) Analysis of the impact of conditional conservatism triggering factors 
To study the impact of contracts, litigation risk, taxation, and political costs on the empirical 
measures of conditional conservatism, we incorporate proxies for each of the four determinants 
of conditional conservatism (as well as proxies for unconditional conservatism) into the Basu 
conditional conservatism model as follows: 
Xt = β0 + β1 Dt + β01 DETt + β11 Dt DETt +  
+ β2 Rt + β21 Rt DETt + β3 Dt Rt + β31 Dt Rt DETt + µt          (2) 
Where DET is alternatively each of the four economic determinants of conditional conservatism 
identified in section 2 above, and all other variables are defined as before. Model (2) is run 
separately for each of the determinants. Our empirical proxies for each of the four determinants 
capture both cross-sectional and time-series variation in each factor. As we explain in more 
detail below, several of the determinants likely induce both conditional and unconditional 
conservatism in accounting, and thus, it is important to define empirical proxies that correctly 
capture the incentives for conditional conservatism. For example, given the evidence in Qiang 
(2007), we expect to find a negative association between conditional conservatism and firm-
specific litigation risk. Firm-specific litigation risk exhibits little variation over time, and thus it 
likely induces unconditional conservatism. However, economy-wide litigation risk varies 
substantially over time and induces changes in conditional conservatism (Basu, 1997; 
                                                 
5 Basu’s model has been subject to criticism along two main fronts: (1) it cannot be used in time-series analysis to 
provide firm-specific measures of conservatism (Givoly and Hayn, 2000; Callen, Hope and Segal, 2008; Givoly, 
Hayn and Natarajan, 2007); and (2) it might partly induce the asymmetry it aims to test (Dietrich, Muller and Riedl, 
2007). However, Ryan (2006) and Ball and Kothari (2007) show that Dietrich et al.’s criticisms are unwarranted, 
and evidence in García Lara et al. (2008) is consistent with the biases being small and unlikely to alter inferences.  
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Holthausen and Watts, 2001). These effects will be captured by the β31 coefficient in model (2). 
In this model, positive (negative) values of β31 signify that higher values of the identified 
determinant are associated to higher (lower) levels of conditional conservatism. We explain 
below how different pressures derived from contracting, litigation, taxation and regulation, as 
captured by different proxies, lead to incentives for engaging in conditional or unconditional 
conservative accounting choices. 
Contracting incentives for conditional conservatism  
We use leverage (LEV) as a proxy for the pressures received from debt-holders to report 
conditionally conservative earnings. To measure LEV, we first estimate firms’ leverage as the 
ratio of total interest-bearing debt to total assets, both measured at the beginning of the fiscal 
year. This proxy of firm’s leverage is then interacted with the Moody’s seasoned Baa corporate 
bond annual yield (in percentage). Firms with higher leverage are expected to face incentives for 
conditional conservatism, particularly, in years when the corporate bond yield rate is greater. As 
a sensitivity check, we repeat our tests using two additional measures of leverage: (a) raw 
leverage (not interacted with the annual bond yield); and (b) industry-adjusted leverage, 
calculated adjusting firm leverage by subtracting the two-digit SIC leverage industry mean. Our 
results are not sensitive to these alternative specifications. 
 Additionally, in our sensitivity tests, we use measures of the strength of firm governance 
structures as proxies for the expected costs from compensation or equity contracting. Prior 
research shows that better governed firms present more conditionally conservative numbers. We 
use the governance measure (GOV) proposed by Davila and Penalva (2006), which includes both 
internal and external corporate governance provisions. Higher levels of GOV indicate better 
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governance (low antitakeover protection and low CEO involvement in board decisions). 
Corporate governance quality (GOV) captures investors demand for tighter monitoring in the 
presence of accounting- or equity- based contracting that may generate incentives for aggressive 
accounting choices. Better governance is expected to induce conditional conservatism. 
Litigation risk incentives for conditional and unconditional conservatism 
We use two measures of litigation risk that capture different incentives for implementing 
conditional versus unconditional conservative practices. Our first proxy of litigation risk (LITA) 
is designed to capture auditor litigation incentives for conditional conservative reporting. LITA is 
an indicator variable that equals 1 if the company’s auditor is a big auditing firm (Compustat 
item #149 between 1 and 8) and if the fiscal year is in a high auditor litigation period; and 0 
otherwise. Following Basu (1997) and Holthausen and Watts (2001), we take the three periods 
comprising 1967 to 1975, 1983 to 1995, and 2001 to 2005 as of high auditor litigation risk. The 
latter period accounts for the increase in litigation that followed the spate of accounting scandals 
(Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, etc.). Consistent with prior evidence by Basu (1997) and 
Holthausen and Watts (2001), we expect LITA to induce conditional conservatism. 
 As our second proxy for litigation risk, designed to capture litigation-related incentives to 
implement unconditionally conservative numbers, we measure the level of firm-specific 
litigation risk using the proxy proposed by Johnson, Kasznik and Nelson (2001). We refer to this 
variable as Firm litigation risk, defined as the first factor of a principal component analysis of 
five variables: log of assets, beta, stock returns, returns skewness and stock turnover. Firm 
litigation risk captures the firm’s market volatility. Higher values of Firm litigation risk have 
been shown to be associated with greater likelihood of being sued. Finally, we construct LITF as 
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an indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if Firm litigation risk is in the top quartile; and 0 
otherwise. LITF is expected to induce mainly unconditional conservatism. 
Taxation driven incentives for conditional and unconditional conservatism 
To analyse the effect of taxation over conservatism we create two proxies: a proxy of firm-year 
level tax pressures, which are expected to induce conditional conservatism, and a proxy of book-
tax conformity that is expected to capture incentives for unconditional conservatism. 
 With respect to tax-related incentives for conditional conservatism, we posit that 
managerial incentives to delay tax payments are directly associated to current-period tax 
pressures faced by the firm. We measure firm-specific tax pressures using a proxy for the 
marginal tax rate (TAX), that equals the highest statutory corporate income tax rate if the firm has 
a high marginal tax rate; and 0 otherwise. We follow Plesko (2003) and assume that a firm 
enjoys a low marginal tax rate if it has unused net operating loss carryforwards and zero or 
negative pre-tax income. Otherwise, firms are assumed to have a high marginal tax rate. Plesko 
shows that this proxy is almost as good as the real marginal tax rate computed from data in the 
firm’s tax return. This simple approximation also compares favourably with the simulated 
marginal tax rates derived in Graham (1996). However, marginal tax rate is at least partially a 
function of net income, the dependent variable in model (2), which could introduce an 
econometric problem (Hausman and Wise, 1977). To correct this problem, we first run a 
regression of TAX on net income, and define our tax proxy (TAXc) as the residuals from this 
regression. This ensures that TAXc is orthogonal to the dependent variable in regression (2).6 
                                                 
6 Variation in tax rules over time might potentially affect the accounting instruments available to management to 
delay the recognition of gains or accelerate the recognition of losses, but it is unlikely that they affect managerial 
incentives, unless they affect tax rates. We are interested in measuring tax-related incentives for conditional 
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Since the Plesko (2003) proxy was only validated on a few recent years’ actual tax 
returns, its accuracy is not guaranteed in prior years. As a sensitivity test we use an alternative 
proxy for the marginal tax rate developed by Graham (1996) and Graham and Mills (2008). This 
proxy, based on financial statement data, has been shown to be highly correlated with simulated 
rates based on corporate tax return data.7 As in the case of TAXc, the marginal tax rate is also the 
residual of a regression of Graham’s marginal tax rates on net income. Results are robust to this 
alternative definition of tax pressures. Both measures, TAXc and the marginal tax rate as per 
Graham, are expected to create tax related income-shifting incentives that will translate into 
more conditionally conservative numbers. That is, given current taxation pressures, managers 
anticipate (defer) the recognition of losses (gains) that otherwise they would have disregarded 
(recognised) given their general incentives for aggressive accounting practices. 
 To analyse how taxation drives unconditional conservatism we follow a similar approach 
to Qiang (2007) and create a proxy (TAXu) that captures the degree of conformity between tax 
income and book income. TAXu equals 1 if the average over three years (t to t-2) of the ratio 
current income tax (Compustat #16 – #50) over tax expense (Compustat #16) is between 0.8 and 
1.2, and 0 otherwise. A ratio closer to 1 indicates higher tax-book conformity. TAXu is expected 
to be associated with unconditional conservatism. 
Regulation-based incentives for conditional and unconditional conservatism 
To study the association between political costs and conservatism, we create two proxies for 
political scrutiny. The first one (REGc) is a firm-specific proxy capturing economy-wide public 
                                                                                                                                                             
conservatism. TAXc captures how these incentives change over time by incorporating the annual highest statutory 
corporate income tax rate. Thus, changes in tax rules that alter taxation pressures over time are captured by TAXc. 
7 We download marginal tax rates from Graham’s website, which are available since 1980. We thank him for 
providing the data. 
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scrutiny. We build REGc as an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm pertains to a 
regulated industry (financials and utilities) in years in which there is a decline in the rate of GDP 
growth and an increase in the rate of inflation; and 0 otherwise. Pressures from regulators are 
likely higher in periods of economic downturn, given regulators’ asymmetric loss functions. 
REGc captures these political costs that create incentives for firms under regulators’ scrutiny to 
shift income to periods with a lower public visibility, inducing conditional conservatism. Our 
second proxy (REGu), identical to the one used by Qiang (2007), is a cross-sectional firm-level 
proxy with low time-series variation. It measures firms’ market share and captures monopoly 
power. We create REGu as an indicator variable that equals 1 if the ratio of sales deflated by 
(industry total sales / number of firms in the industry) is in the top quartile and 0 otherwise. 
Industry is based on the two-digit SIC code. REGu is expected to capture incentives for 
unconditional conservatism. 
Unconditional conservatism proxies 
The main proxy that we use for unconditional conservatism is a modification of the bias 
component of Beaver and Ryan (2000). They use the market value of equity as the benchmark to 
measure conservatism as a persistent downward bias in book value of equity. They measure 
conservatism using the firm-specific intercept of a regression of book-to-market on firm and time 
intercepts, and current and lagged stock returns. In their model, returns act as a proxy for current 
information and the coefficients on returns capture lags in the timing with which book value 
incorporates the information. However, the method of Beaver and Ryan does not allow for 
asymmetric incorporation of good and bad news into book value. This introduces noise in the 
firm-specific intercept because it captures unconditional bias, as well as the conditional bias not 
captured by the returns coefficients. Like in Qiang (2007), our method allows for the coefficients 
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on returns to be asymmetric to good and bad news by incorporating the Basu (1997) framework 
into the estimation of the bias component. In particular, we estimate the following model: 
6
, 1 , 2 , 3 , , ,
0
i t i t i t j i t j i t j i t j i t
j
BTM D R D Rα α β β β μ− − − −
=
⎡ ⎤= + + + + +⎣ ⎦∑           (3) 
where BTM is the book-to-market value of equity ratio measured at the end of the fiscal year, R 
is the annual stock rate of return of the firm, measured compounding twelve monthly CRSP 
stock returns ending three months after the last day of fiscal year t. D is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 in the case of bad news (negative or zero rate of return) and 0 in the case of good news 
(positive stock rate of return). The firm-specific intercept αi measures the level of unconditional 
conservatism. To construct annual firm-specific measures of unconditional conservatism, we 
estimate regression (3) annually using rolling three-year windows. For instance, to obtain the 
firm-specific measure of unconditional conservatism for year 2005, we run equation (3) pooling 
firm-year observations for 2005, 2004 and 2003. Then, we use the αi intercepts as our measure of 
unconditional conservatism for 2005. In addition, Basu (2005) points out that greater 
unconditional conservatism should lead to a lower intercept in equation (1). For this reason, we 
add the intercept of annual Basu regressions to our modified bias component. We refer to this 
final measure of unconditional conservatism as UCons. To facilitate the interpretation of UCons 
we multiply it by –1, so that greater values of this measure indicate higher unconditional 
conservatism. 
(iii) The sample 
We extract accounting data from Compustat, stock market data from CRSP, and macroeconomic 
data from the web site of the U.S. Federal Reserve. To facilitate the interpretation of the results, 
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we use a constant sample: observations that have missing values for any of our proxies are 
excluded from the sample. This produces a sample that contains 93,838 firm-year observations, 
corresponding to 10,873 distinct firms, over the 42-year period from 1964 to 2005. To reduce the 
adverse effect of influential observations, every year we winsorise all continuous variables at the 
1st and 99th percentiles. Table 1 Panel A contains sample descriptive statistics. Consistent with 
prior research, net income is negatively skewed, showing that conditional conservatism exists in 
our sample. Returns are positively skewed and, as expected, the variation of returns is larger than 
the variation of earnings. Sample firms present negative returns 42% of the times. Table 1 Panel 
B presents Pearson correlation coefficients of main variables. Analysing the correlations between 
our proxies of the determinants, it can be readily observed that none of them is above 0.2 (the 
highest correlation is between LEV and TAXu, at -0.166).8 This evidence supports our 
expectation that the proxies capture different underlying phenomena. Finally, and consistent with 
our expectations, the proxies that capture incentives for reporting conditionally conservative 
numbers (LITA, TAXc, REGc) show a much more pronounced time-series variation than the 
proxies that capture incentives for reporting unconditionally conservative numbers (LITF, TAXu, 
REGu). Specifically, the coefficient of variation of the annual mean of LITA (TAXc, REGc) is 
approximately 13 (8, 12) times that of LITF (TAXu, REGu). 
                                                 
8 In the correlation matrix, the use of a constant sample leads to a correlation of -0.006 between TAXc and net 
income. As described in Section 3, we obtain TAXc as the residuals of a regression of TAX on net income, where we 
use all available observations. For the whole sample, the correlation between TAXc and net income is 0.000. 
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4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
(i) Effect of individual determinants on conditional conservatism 
Table 2, Panels A to E, reports results of running equation (2), where we interact the original 
Basu (1997) model alternatively with each of our proxies for the conservatism determinants and, 
finally, with unconditional conservatism. Following Petersen (2008), we use pooled regressions 
and report t-statistics based on standard errors clustered at the firm and year level, which are 
robust to both heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation. All the p-values are based on 
two-tailed tests.9  
Panel A shows the results of interacting the original Basu model with our contracting 
proxies. Focusing on the main coefficient of interest, the β31 coefficient of model (2), we see that 
conditional conservatism increases with debt contracting as measured by the interaction between 
financial leverage and Moody’s seasoned Baa corporate bond annual yield (Panel A1, β31 = 
0.059; t-stat = 8.55). This is consistent with high levered firms in years where the corporate bond 
yield rate is greater providing more conditionally conservative numbers. This result is robust to 
the use of two alternative proxies for debt contracting: raw leverage and industry-adjusted 
leverage. With respect to our governance proxy for investors’ demand for conditional 
conservatism arising from managerial compensation contracts, Panel A2 shows that stronger 
governance induces more conditional conservatism (β31 = 0.066; t-stat = 5.60). This evidence is 
consistent with the results in Beekes et al. (2004), Ahmed and Duellman (2007) and García Lara 
                                                 
9 To perform the two-way clustering we use Petersen’s (2008) Stata command cluster2, available from his website. 
We are grateful to him for making the code available. As a sensitivity check we run Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
mean annual regressions corrected for serial correlation using the Newey and West (1987) procedure. Our results are 
not sensitive to this alternative specification. As per Petersen’s recommendation, in a second sensitivity test, we also 
include year dummies in the pooled regressions, in addition to clustering at the firm level. This does not change our 
inferences either. 
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et al. (2008) that stronger governance mechanisms impose stricter managerial monitoring and 
demand increased conditional conservatism.10 
Regarding litigation risk driven incentives for conservatism, Panel B shows that 
conditional conservatism increases with LITA (Panel B1, β31 = 0.217; t-stat = 4.31). LITA 
measures auditor’s litigation risk exposure, as measured by combining litigation risk period with 
auditor size (size is a proxy both of auditor reputation concerns and the deep pockets hypothesis: 
large auditors suffering greater losses in case of audit failure, both in terms of reputation and 
wealth). LITA allows for cross-sectional and time-series variation in auditors’ litigation exposure 
and is therefore expected to induce conditional conservatism. This result holds when we use a 
pure time-series proxy for litigation like in Basu (1997) and Holthausen and Watts (2001). On 
the other hand, consistent with our expectation that firm-level litigation risk with little time-
series variation induces only unconditional conservatism, Panel B2 shows a negative relation 
between LITF and conditional conservatism (β31 = -0.148; t-stat = -4.45). 
With respect to taxation and regulation, results indicate that our proxies for taxation 
pressures (TAXc) and regulation pressures (REGc) appear to correctly capture incentives for 
conditional conservatism, as greater values of these proxies are associated to increases in the 
timeliness of income to bad news (Panel C1, β31 = 0.013; t-stat = 4.41, and Panel D1, β31 = 0.195; 
t-stat = 1.95, respectively). Our taxation results are robust to the use of the simulated marginal 
tax rates proposed by Graham (1996). Panels C2 and D2 show that firm-level proxies for 
taxation and regulation that do not particularly change over time (TAXu and REGu) are not 
associated with increases in conditional conservatism (in fact, we observe significantly negative 
                                                 
10 In Panel A2, GOV is only available for 10,444 firm-year observations because the data to construct this proxy is 
drawn from Execucomp, which starts in 1992. For this reason, we exclude GOV from the rest of analyses. 
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β31 coefficients), consistent with firm-specific time-invariant taxation and regulation pressures 
inducing mainly unconditional conservatism.  
Finally, Panel E shows that, as expected, the timeliness of earnings to economic losses 
decreases when unconditional conservatism is high (β31 = -0.160; t-stat = -4.21). Greater 
unconditional conservatism is also associated with reductions in the timeliness of earnings to 
good news (Panel E, β21 = -0.030; t-stat = -2.10), which suggests that unconditional conservatism 
generally dampens the timeliness of accounting income. Although Basu (2005) argues that the 
intercepts of Basu regressions are also capturing unconditional conservatism, we rely on the 
more direct test in Panel E to analyse the relation between conditional and unconditional 
conservatism, as the intercepts are also a function of cost of capital (Pope and Walker, 1999) and 
Basu (1997) also argues that they capture the delayed incorporation in earnings of good news 
from prior periods. For these reasons, intercepts do not yield an unambiguous interpretation. 
The evidence in Table 2 is therefore consistent with our expectation that conditional 
conservatism is positively associated to contracting, litigation, taxation, and regulation, even if 
litigation, taxation and regulation primarily induce unconditional conservatism. Put together, 
these results strongly indicate that all four determinants create incentives for conditional 
conservatism, as identified by Watts (2003). Also, our evidence suggests that even though time-
invariant taxation and regulation pressures likely result in the implementation of unconditionally 
conservative accounting policies, this stock of unconditional conservatism does not exhaust the 
opportunities (or incentives) for successful conditional conservatism in later periods. 
To assess the economic significance of higher exposure to each of the four determinants 
of conditional conservatism, we compute the percentage increase in asymmetric timeliness when 
the exposure to a determinant changes from a low bound to a high bound. For LEV and TAXc the 
 29
low (high) bound is defined as percentile 25 (percentile 75). For the indicator variables LITA and 
REGc the low bound is 0 and the high bound is 1. Therefore, using the coefficient estimates from 
Panels A1-D1, we compute the change in (β3 + β31 * DET) when the determinant moves from the 
low bound to the high bound. For LEV, the increase in asymmetric timelines is 0.151 (52.4%); 
for LITA is 0.217 (68.8%); for TAXc is 0.139 (36.7%); and for REGc is 0.195 (50.5%). The 
percentage increase is computed by dividing the change in asymmetric timeliness by its value at 
the lower bound. This ratio-based definition of the increase in conditional conservatism presents 
the advantage that it isolates the measure from the possible effects of cost of capital on 
coefficient β3 (Pope and Walker, 1999). The conclusion from these estimates is that, on average, 
firms’ sensitivity to bad news increases by approximately 50% when the exposure to the 
determinant of conditional conservatism changes from the low bound to the high bound. 
(ii) Joint effect of all determinants on conditional conservatism 
The analysis of Table 2 however, fails to demonstrate whether each of the determinants is 
associated with incrementally significant effects on conditional conservatism or whether some of 
them merely capture the same underlying phenomenon. As a second test, we consider the effects 
of all the determinants in a single test. To do so, we interact the Basu specification with all the 
determinants and unconditional conservatism in the same regression. Table 3 Panel A reports 
results of this test. The results confirm those previously reported in Table 2, that is, conditional 
conservatism increases with contracting, as well as with litigation, taxation and regulatory 
pressures that create income-shifting incentives and thus induce conditional conservatism. Firm-
specific time invariant litigation, taxation and regulatory pressures are negatively associated to 
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conditional conservatism, consistent with these pressures mainly resulting in the implementation 
of unconditionally conservative accounting practices.  
From these results we conclude that each of these determinants is associated with 
incrementally significant effects on conditional conservatism, and we can discard the alternative 
explanation that they merely capture the same underlying phenomenon. The β31 coefficient 
magnitudes from Table 2 are very similar to those reported in Table 3 Panel A, suggesting that 
each of the economic determinants is fairly orthogonal to the other variables. The last column of 
Panel A presents the evolution in the adjusted R-squared as we incorporate additional 
determinants to the model. For the simple Basu model, we obtain an adjusted R-squared of 
0.111. The explanatory power of our model increases monotonically as we add the determinants, 
up to 0.169 for the full model. These test results are robust to the use of the already described 
alternative proxies for the conservatism determinants.11  
(iii) Sensitivity tests 
To check the robustness of our findings, we run a series of sensitivity tests to control for: (1) the 
inclusion of observations affected by mergers and acquisitions; (2) the effect of information 
asymmetries on conditional conservatism; (3) the differential demand for conservatism that 
originates from private vs. public debt contracts; and (4) the effects of the interaction between 
leverage and taxation. In addition, (5) we re-examine the association between conditional 
conservatism and the determinants, using changes in their levels, rather than the original 
determinants; and (6) we analyse the effect of removing interest and tax expense from the 
                                                 
11 Given the large number of regressors, it is prudent to test for the presence of multicollinearity. To do so, we 
compute the variance inflation factors (VIF) of the independent variables. The only regressor with a VIF larger than 
10, the cut off value suggested by some analysts, is D (VIF=13.32). After removing D from the regression, the 
highest VIF is 8.97 and there are virtually no changes in the coefficients and standard errors estimated for the rest of 
independent variables. This clearly shows that multicollinearity is not driving our inferences. 
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dependent variable, net income, as these two earnings components are endogenous to 
conservatism forces. 
Effect of mergers and acquisitions  
We control for the potentially detrimental effect that major non-recurring transactions, such as 
mergers or acquisitions, can have on our conservatism measures and independent variables 
(Hribar and Collins, 2002). Table 3 Panel B presents results of running our joint model excluding 
firm-year observations in which mergers or acquisitions (M&A) took place. The sample is 
reduced to 79,583 firm-year observations due to this procedure. All our main inferences remain 
identical.  
Information asymmetry and conditional conservatism 
As an additional sensitivity analysis, and given the evidence provided by LaFond and Watts 
(2008) that managers increase conditional conservatism to ameliorate the negative effects of 
information asymmetries, we include in the regression in Table 3 the bid-ask spread (BAS), a 
proxy for information asymmetries. BAS is an indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 if the 
average bid-ask spread of the firm at t-1 is in the top quartile of the distribution, and 0 otherwise. 
The bid-ask spread is defined as the annual average of daily closing bid-ask spread, scaled by the 
midpoint between the bid and the ask. Table 4 Panel A provides results of including BAS in the 
full model with all the determinants. Consistent with prior evidence in LaFond and Watts (2008), 
information asymmetry is positively associated to conditional conservatism (D*R*BAS = 0.127, 
t-stat = 4.25), suggesting that conditional conservatism appears as a reaction to information 
asymmetries. All the determinants remain significant and have the expected signs. Thus, our 
inferences are not affected by including this additional regressor, suggesting that the economic 
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determinants capture incentives for implementing conditionally conservative accounting policies 
in addition to those driven by information asymmetries. 
Private vs. Public debt-contracting, and the effect of taxation on debt-incentives 
Leftwich (1983) reports that private debt contracts undo many aggressive accounting choices in 
covenant calculations, which likely indicates that private debt-holders require more conservative 
accounting than provided by GAAP, suggesting a more flexible use of GAAP figures in private 
debt contracts. Thus, our debt-contracting proxy (LEV) may act as an upwardly biased proxy for 
public debt contracts that rely on reported figures for evaluating covenant breaches. As a 
sensitivity check, we repeat the analysis of Table 2 Panel A1, including a proxy for private debt 
contracts (PRIVDBT) in the model. PRIVDBT is the ratio, in percentage, of private long-term 
debt (Compustat #81 + #83 + #84) to total long-term debt (Compustat #81 + #82 + #83 + #84). 
Table 4 Panel B presents the results of this test. Both LEV and PRIVDBT are positively 
associated to conditional conservatism (D*R*LEV = 0.055, t-stat = 7.84; D*R*PRIVDBT = 
0.131, t-stat = 3.53). In fact, the evidence shows that the greater the proportion of private debt, 
the greater the conditional conservatism. This evidence suggests that, if anything, flexible use of 
GAAP numbers in private debt contracts results in an additional demand for conditional 
conservatism. 
 Regarding our debt-contracting tests, time-series variation in income tax rates likely also 
affects the attractiveness of debt, because interest tax deductions may become more valuable 
whenever there is a change in tax rates. As an additional test of the association between debt 
contracting and conditional conservatism, we interact our debt-contracting proxy with a time-
series proxy of tax pressures (TAX). TAX equals the highest statutory corporate income tax rate if 
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the firm has a high marginal tax rate and 0 otherwise. Results of this test are presented in Table 4 
Panel C. The evidence suggests that whenever income taxes are higher, the association between 
conditional conservatism and debt-contracting becomes increasingly positive (β31 = 0.124; t-stat 
= 5.15), consistent with the interpretation that taxation can impact the association between 
conditional conservatism and debt-contracting. 
Changes in the level of the determinants of conditional conservatism 
As a robustness check, we examine the association between changes in each of the determinants 
(rather than the levels) and conditional conservatism. We focus on changes in the main variables 
of interest, i.e., changes in our proxies for incentives for conditional conservatism: ∆LEV, 
∆LITA, ∆TAXc and ∆RECc. To increase the power of our tests we define ∆ as the change from t-
3 to t. Table 5 Panels A to D contains the results of running model (2), where we interact the 
original Basu (1997) model alternatively with each of these proxies, measured as changes in the 
levels of the original determinants. The results confirm the previously reported evidence: 
conditional conservatism appears as a reaction to changes in the level of contracting incentives 
(Panel A, β31 = 0.036; t-stat = 2.27); litigation-risk related incentives (Panel B, β31 = 0.143; t-stat 
= 2.35); tax pressures (Panel C, β31 = 0.016; t-stat = 4.72);12 and regulation incentives (Panel D, 
β31 = 0.199; t-stat = 2.28). Including all four determinants in the same regression, like we did in 
Table 3, produces the same inferences. 
                                                 
12 When the tax variable, TAXc is computed using Graham’s (2006) marginal tax rates, the coefficient on 
D*R*∆TAXc is 0.021, t-stat = 4.87. 
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Removing from net income the effect of interest and tax expense 
We use net income as the earnings construct in our tests. Net income may already reflect tax (via 
tax charge) and cost of debt (via interest expense). Thus, our dependent variable may incorporate 
some of the tax and debt contracting effects we aim to measure. As a sensitivity analysis, we 
study the association between conservatism, taxation and debt contracting using as the dependent 
variable in model (2) net income before interest and tax expense (EBIT). By using EBIT as the 
dependent variable, we eliminate the effects of earnings components that are endogenous to 
conservatism forces. Table 6 presents the results of this test. The evidence contained in the Table 
confirms the previously reported evidence: conditional conservatism is positively associated with 
debt contracting incentives (Panel A, β31 = 0.048; t-stat = 4.76); and tax pressures (Panel B, β31 = 
0.013; t-stat = 4.06). The results contained in Table 6 also confirm that taxation pressures 
generate incentives for unconditionally conservative accounting (Panel C, β31 = -0.072; t-stat = -
2.73) after controlling for the potentially confounding effect of earnings components endogenous 
to conservatism forces, consistent with the previously reported evidence.   
(iv) Portfolio analysis of the determinants of conditional conservatism 
As an alternative test framework, in addition to analysing how each of the factors drives 
conditional conservatism on an individual basis, we jointly analyse if firms with a larger 
aggregate exposure to the four determinants present more conditionally conservative accounting. 
Our objective is to analyse the interaction between the triggering factors and their overall effect 
over accounting choice. To do so, we assign each firm a score depending on their exposure to 
each of the four conservatism triggering factors and unconditional conservatism. High (low) 
exposure to a determinant is assigned a score of 1 (0):  
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(a) Leverage (Lev): Lev is an indicator variable that equals 1 if LEV (see Table 1) is 
above the median and 0 otherwise. 
(b) Tax pressures for conditional conservatism (Taxc): Taxc equals 1 if TAXc (see 
Table 1) is above the median and 0 otherwise.  
(c) Tax pressures for unconditional conservatism (TAXu): TAXu equals 1 if the 
average over three years (t to t-2) of the ratio current income tax over tax expense is 
between 0.8 and 1.2, and 0 otherwise. 
(d) Political pressures for conditional conservatism (REGc): REGc equals 1 in years 
in which there is a decline in the rate of growth of GDP and an increase in the rate of 
inflation and 0 otherwise.  
(e) Political pressures for unconditional conservatism (REGu): REGu equals 1 if sales 
deflated by (industry total sales / number of firms in the industry) is in the top quartile 
and 0 otherwise. 
(f) Auditor Litigation risk period (LITA): LITA equals 1 if the firm is audited by a 
large auditing firm and the fiscal year is in a high auditor litigation period, 0 
otherwise. 
(g) Firm-level litigation risk (LITF): LITF equals 1 if the Firm litigation risk proxy is 
in the top quartile of the annual distribution and 0 otherwise. 
(h) Unconditional conservatism (UC): UC equals 1 if UCons (see Table 1) is above the 
median, and 0 otherwise.  
Based on these scores, we create portfolios of firm-year observations. For example, in portfolio 1 
we classify firm-year observations with a score of 1 on Lev, 0 on Taxc, 0 on TAXu, 0 on REGc, 0 
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on REGu, 0 on LITA, 0 on LITF, and 0 on UC; in portfolio 2 we classify firm-year observations 
with a score of 1 on Lev, 1 on Taxc, 0 on TAXu, 0 on REGc, 0 on REGu, 0 on LITA, 0 on LITF, 
and 0 on UC; and so on. The combination of the eight variables (the four determinants, including 
three definitions of the determinants that capture incentives for unconditional conservatism, plus 
one control for cumulative unconditional conservatism) originates 256 portfolios (28). Next, we 
estimate the Basu model (1) for each of these portfolios to obtain β3, the asymmetric timeliness 
coefficient. To improve the robustness of our findings, we remove 9 portfolios that produce a 
negative β3 estimate. This yields a final set of 247 usable portfolios. We use the estimated β3 
coefficients (conditional conservatism measures) from these regressions as the dependent 
variable in a weighted regression of this coefficient on the four economic determinants of 
conditional conservatism and control variables for unconditional conservatism. Inspired by 
Cremers and Nair (2005), to increase the power of our tests, we take into account the precision in 
the estimation of the β3 coefficients. We use the inverse of the square of the standard error of the 
estimated β3 coefficient to weight the variables in the regression below.  
 CCons = γ0 + γ1 Lev + γ2 LITA + γ3 LITF + γ4 Taxc + γ5 TAXu + γ6 REGc + 
+ γ7 REGu + γ8 UC + ε             (4) 
where CCons is the β3 coefficient estimated for each portfolio. The explanatory variables have 
already been defined above. 
Results of the portfolio approach are reported in Table 7 and are consistent with the main 
results reported in Tables 2 and 3. Table 7 Panel A contains descriptive statistics of our measure 
of conditional conservatism at the portfolio level (CCons). The mean (median) value of CCons, 
the β3 coefficient of the Basu regression (1), is 0.359 (0.288) consistent with a robust presence of 
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conditional conservatism in all portfolios. The mean (median) number of observations per 
portfolio equals 372 (252). Table 7 Panel B presents Pearson correlation coefficients of the 
determinants and CCons. Analysing the correlations between our proxies of the determinants, it 
can be readily observed that the proxies that measure incentives for conditional conservatism 
(Lev, LITA, Taxc and REGc) are all positively associated to CCons. The proxies that measure 
incentives for unconditional conservatism (LITF, TAXu and REGu) also behave as expected, and 
are all negatively associated with CCons, as is UC, our proxy for unconditional conservatism.  
Table 7 Panel C presents results of running equation (4) above. The results confirm that 
all the conservatism triggering factors drive conditional conservatism in the expected direction 
(Lev = 0.140, t-stat = 8.73; LITA = 0.070, t-stat = 4.93; Taxc = 0.091, t-stat = 6.52; and REGc = 
0.021, t-stat = 1.91, respectively). Additionally, the results confirm that our proxies for economic 
determinants of unconditional conservatism are negatively associated with conditional 
conservatism (LITF = -0.045, t-stat = -3.45; TAXu = -0.052, t-stat = -4.06; and REGu = -0.113, t-
stat = -8.18, respectively). These negative relations are consistent with our findings in previous 
analyses and confirm that time-invariant exposure to litigation, regulation and taxation pressures 
likely induces more unconditionally conservative accounting choices, which reduces the 
opportunities to be conditionally conservative. Put together, this evidence is consistent with these 
three triggering factors generating incentives both for conditional and unconditional 
conservatism and with the increases in unconditional conservatism not exhausting the 
opportunities (and incentives) for conditional conservatism. Similarly, our proxy for the level of 
unconditional conservatism is also negative and significant (UC = -0.058, t-stat = -3.96), 
consistent with the arguments in Beaver and Ryan (2005) that unconditional conservatism pre-
empts conditional conservatism. From the evidence presented in this Table, it can be readily 
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observed that although some of our variable definitions may appear to over-simplify the 
underlying concepts, they explain a significant amount of the variation in conditional 
conservatism (the adjusted R2 equals 0.638).  
(v) Alternative proxy of conditional conservatism: the asymmetric persistence model 
The asymmetric recognition criteria for economic gains and losses in earnings implies that gains 
are recognized as persistent components of earnings, while economic losses are recognized fully 
in the period when they become known, and thus behave as temporary income decreases that 
reverse in the following period. Thus, a consequence of conditional conservatism is the 
asymmetric persistence of earnings (Basu, 1997; Pope and Walker, 1999; Ball and Shivakumar, 
2005). As a robustness check of the association between conditional conservatism and the four 
economic determinants, we study the association between each of the determinants and the 
asymmetric persistence of earnings. To do so, we use the time series model of asymmetric 
persistence of income changes developed by Basu (1997) and Ball and Shivakumar (2005), 
incorporating the determinants as we did previously (see model 2):  
ΔNIt = β0 + β01 DETt + β1 DΔNIt-1 + β11 DΔNIt-1 DETt + β2 ΔNIt-1 
+ β21 ΔNIt-1 DETt + β3 ΔNIt-1 DΔNIt-1 + β31 ΔNIt-1 DΔNIt-1 DETt + µt        (5) 
where ΔNIt is change in net income deflated by beginning-of-period total assets, and DΔNIt-1 is a 
dummy variable taking the value of one if the prior year change in net income is negative; and 0 
otherwise. The economic determinants (DET) are measured as before. In model (5), the 
coefficient β3 captures conditional conservatism (asymmetric persistence). Given that negative 
earnings changes reverse, β3 is expected to be significantly negative if losses are reflected on a 
timelier basis than gains. Good news in earnings being persistent implies β2 should be close to 
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zero or positive. We expect that asymmetric persistence will increase whenever debt-contracting, 
litigation, taxation and regulation pressures increase. These effects will be captured by the β31 
coefficient in model (5).  
Table 8 Panels A to D presents results of running equation (5) above for each of the four 
economic determinants. The results confirm that conditional conservatism as reflected by the 
asymmetric persistence of earnings appears as a reaction to changes in the level of contracting 
incentives (Panel A, β31 = -0.017; t-stat = -2.21); taxation pressures (Panel C, β31 = -0.002; t-stat 
= -2.75); and regulation incentives (Panel D, β31 = -0.097; t-stat = -2.03). Using this alternative 
measure of conditional conservatism, our proxy for litigation-related incentives becomes 
insignificant (Panel B, β31 = 0.055; t-stat = 1.33). This is likely caused by noise in the 
asymmetric persistence measure, which is less precise than the one proposed by Basu. It should 
be noted, however, that asymmetric persistence measures avoid the recent criticism in Dietrich et 
al. (2007), who suggest that the Basu model might be biased. However, and as noted by Ryan 
(2006) and Ball and Kothari (2007), the biases in the Basu market based model are likely to be 
small. Put together, the evidence from both the asymmetric timeliness and asymmetric 
persistence tests strongly supports our prediction that regulation and taxation pressures induce 
conditional conservatism. 
 
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Using a large sample of US firms for the period 1964 to 2005, we analyse how contracting, 
litigation, taxation and regulation affect the choice of conditional versus unconditional 
conservative accounting policies. There is scarce empirical evidence and mixed views on which 
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are the economic determinants of conservatism in accounting and what types of conservatism 
they trigger. Prior work by Watts (2003), Ball (2001), Ball and Shivakumar (2005) and Basu 
(2005) identifies four main triggering factors for conservatism: contracting, litigation, taxation 
and regulation. We study if these factors induce conditional conservatism or if some of them 
create incentives only for unconditional conservatism, as suggested by prior empirical work 
(Qiang, 2007).  
Our empirical results are consistent with contracting inducing conditional conservatism 
only and with litigation, taxation and regulation inducing both conditional and unconditional 
conservatism. Contrary to prior research, we show that time-varying taxation and regulation 
pressures create incentives for shifting income to periods with lower taxation and regulatory 
pressures. This income shifting strategies induce conditional conservatism, as managers (1) 
recognise current economic losses that otherwise they would have chosen to delay given their 
incentives to report aggressively, and (2) delay the recognition of current economic gains that 
they would have reported otherwise. We construct proxies for taxation and regulation that are 
able to capture these incentives for the implementation of conditionally conservative accounting 
policies. Finally, we demonstrate that each of the determinants is associated with incrementally 
significant effects on conditional conservatism, rejecting the alternative view that some of them 
may merely capture the same underlying phenomenon. 
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Table 1 
Variable definition and descriptive statistics of main variables 
 
Panel A: Univariate statistics 
Variable description Var. name Mean Std. Dev. P25 Median P75 
Net income X 0.038 0.221 0.022 0.066 0.112 
Returns R 0.174 0.608 -0.172 0.083 0.383 
Negative return dummy D 0.415 0.493 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Leverage*average bond yield LEV 2.194 1.849 0.668 1.939 3.224 
Auditor litigation indicator LITA 0.362 0.481 0 0 1 
Firm litigation risk indicator LITF 0.268 0.443 0 0 1 
High marginal tax rate proxy TAXc 1.011 10.734 -2.203 -0.573 8.816 
Tax/book income conformity indicator TAXu 0.516 0.500 0 1 1 
Regulation indicator: worsening economic outlook REGc 0.039 0.193 0 0 0 
Regulation indicator: high market share REGu 0.379 0.485 0 0 1 
Unconditional conservatism level UCons -0.062 0.401 -0.139 -0.052 0.095 
 
Panel B: Correlation matrix 
 X R D LEV LITA LITF TAXc TAXu REGc REGu 
R 0.209          
D -0.229 -0.618         
LEV -0.048 -0.013 0.019        
LITA -0.065 0.009 -0.032 0.049       
LITF 0.019 0.107 -0.012 0.008 0.061      
TAXc -0.006 -0.012 -0.030 0.052 -0.119 -0.038     
TAXu 0.133 0.014 -0.044 -0.166 -0.088 -0.028 0.128    
REGc 0.021 0.006 -0.047 0.043 0.030 0.033 -0.042 -0.047   
REGu 0.069 -0.012 -0.062 0.075 0.039 0.140 0.061 0.033 -0.008  
UCons 0.002 -0.024 0.002 -0.038 0.048 0.049 -0.025 0.069 -0.004 0.132 
The sample contains 93,838 firm-year observations corresponding to 10,873 different firms during the period 1964-
2005. X is net income, deflated by market value of equity at the beginning of the period. R is the stock rate of return 
of the firm, measured compounding twelve monthly CRSP stock returns ending three months after fiscal year end. D 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 in the case of bad news (negative or zero stock rate of return) and 0 in the case of 
good news (positive stock rate of return). LEV equals Leverage×Byld, where Leverage is total interest-bearing debt 
scaled by total assets, measured at the start of the fiscal year, and Byld is Moody's seasoned Baa corporate bond 
annual yield (in percentage). LITA is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the company’s auditor is a big auditing 
firm (Compustat item #149 between 1 and 8) and if the fiscal year is in a high auditor litigation period, and 0 
otherwise. High auditor litigation periods are 1967 to 1975, 1983 to 1995, and 2001 to 2005. LITF is an indicator 
variable for firm litigation risk that equals 1 if Firm litigation risk is in the fourth quartile and 0 otherwise.  Firm 
litigation risk is a proxy for firm litigation risk defined as the first factor of a principal component analysis of five 
variables: log of assets, beta, stock returns, returns skewness and stock turnover. TAXc equals the residuals of a 
regression of TAX on net income. TAX equals the highest statutory corporate income tax rate if the firm has high 
marginal tax rate and 0 otherwise. TAXu equals 1 if the average over three years (t to t-2) of the ratio current income 
tax (Compustat #16–#50) over tax expense (Compustat #16) is between 0.8 and 1.2, and 0 otherwise. REGc is an 
indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm pertains to a regulated industry (financials and utilities) in years in 
which there is a decline in the rate of growth of the GDP and an increase in the rate of inflation, and 0 otherwise. 
REGu is an indicator variable that equals 1 if sales deflated by (industry total sales/ number of firms in the industry) 
is in the top quartile and 0 otherwise. UCons is a firm-year proxy variable for the level of unconditional 
conservatism, estimated as described in the text, constructed so that higher values indicate higher level of 
unconditional conservatism. In Panel B, bold figures indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 2 
Effect of individual determinants on conditional conservatism  
Xt = β0 + β1 Dt + β01 DETt + β11 Dt DETt + β2 Rt + β21 Rt DETt + β3 Dt Rt + β31 Dt Rt DETt + µt 
Panel A: Contracting determinants 
Panel A1: Debt contracting     Panel A2: Managerial contracting 
Coef. t-stat p-val   Coef. t-stat p-val
Constant 0.073 10.92 0.00  Constant 0.052 12.28 0.00
D 0.004 0.60 0.55  D -0.003 -0.80 0.43
LEV 0.001 0.58 0.56  GOV -0.012 -3.47 0.00
D*LEV 0.003 1.24 0.22  D*GOV 0.000 -0.06 0.95
R                    (+) -0.001 -0.12 0.90  R                    (+) -0.011 -1.17 0.24
R*LEV 0.005 2.09 0.04  R*GOV -0.012 -1.79 0.07
D*R               (+) 0.249 6.31 0.00  D*R               (+) 0.130 5.07 0.00
D*R*LEV     (+) 0.059 8.55 0.00  D*R*GOV     (+) 0.066 5.60 0.00
   
Adj. R-squared 0.124  Adj. R-squared 0.081
N. of obs. 93,838  N. of obs. 10,444
 
Panel B: Litigation determinants 
Panel B1: Auditor litigation    Panel B2: Firm-specific litigation 
 Coef. t-stat p-val  Coef. t-stat p-val
Constant 0.082 8.38 0.00 Constant 0.072 11.17 0.00
D 0.005 0.95 0.34 D 0.022 3.54 0.00
LITA -0.014 -1.06 0.29 LITF 0.013 3.06 0.00
D*LITA 0.013 1.17 0.24 D*LITF -0.022 -3.97 0.00
R                    (+) 0.011 0.91 0.36 R                    (+) 0.017 1.26 0.21
R*LITA -0.005 -0.17 0.87 R*LITF -0.015 -3.07 0.00
D*R               (+) 0.316 10.87 0.00 D*R               (+) 0.449 9.10 0.00
D*R*LITA    (+) 0.217 4.31 0.00 D*R*LITF     (–) -0.148 -4.45 0.00
   
Adj. R-squared 0.122  Adj. R-squared 0.115
N. of obs. 93,838  N. of obs. 93,838
 
Panel C: Taxation determinants 
Panel C1: High marginal tax rate   Panel C2: Tax-book conformity 
  Coef. t-stat p-val   Coef. t-stat p-val
Constant 0.077 11.69 0.00 Constant 0.057 8.20 0.00
D 0.011 1.48 0.14 D 0.009 1.27 0.20
TAXc 0.001 1.49 0.14 TAXu 0.034 7.33 0.00
D*TAXc 0.002 3.64 0.00 D*TAXu 0.001 0.14 0.89
R                    (+) 0.006 0.40 0.69 R                    (+) 0.006 0.44 0.66
R*TAXc -0.002 -1.89 0.06 R*TAXu 0.012 1.61 0.11
D*R               (+) 0.407 8.26 0.00 D*R               (+) 0.419 9.67 0.00
D*R*TAXc   (+) 0.013 4.41 0.00 D*R*TAXu   (–) -0.103 -4.22 0.00
   
Adj. R-squared 0.122  Adj. R-squared 0.123
N. of obs. 93,838 N. of obs. 93,838
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Table 2 (Continued) 
Panel D: Regulation determinants 
Panel D1: Regulation, worsening economic Panel D2: Regulation, high market share 
economic outlook     
  Coef. t-stat p-val   Coef. t-stat p-val
Constant 0.076 9.91 0.00 Constant 0.073 10.12 0.00
D 0.011 1.69 0.09 D 0.006 0.88 0.38
REGc 0.006 0.72 0.47 REGu 0.007 2.20 0.03
D*REGc 0.026 1.28 0.20 D*REGu 0.011 2.28 0.02
R                    (+) 0.009 0.68 0.50 R                     (+) 0.009 0.75 0.46
R*REGc 0.033 1.55 0.12 R*REGu 0.003 0.80 0.42
D*R               (+) 0.386 9.83 0.00 D*R                (+) 0.398 10.14 0.00
D*R*REGc   (+) 0.195 1.95 0.05 D*R*REGu    (–) -0.054 -2.52 0.01
   
Adj. R-squared 0.113  Adj. R-squared 0.113
N. of obs. 93,838  N. of obs. 93,838   
 
Panel E: Unconditional conservatism  
 
  Coef. t-stat p-val
Constant 0.076 10.88 0.00
D 0.011 1.68 0.09
UCons -0.016 -1.55 0.12
D*UCons 0.005 0.46 0.65
R                         (+) 0.006 0.48 0.63
R*UCons -0.030 -2.10 0.04
D*R                    (+) 0.383 9.97 0.00
D*R*UCons       (–) -0.160 -4.21 0.00
 
Adj. R-squared 0.118
N. of obs. 93,838
 
The sample contains 93,838 firm-year observations corresponding to 10,873 different firms during the period 1964-
2005. The dependent variable is net income, deflated by market value of equity at the beginning of the period. R is 
the stock rate of return of the firm, measured compounding twelve monthly CRSP stock returns ending three months 
after fiscal year end. D is a dummy variable that equals 1 in the case of bad news (negative or zero stock rate of 
return) and 0 in the case of good news (positive stock rate of return).  LEV equals Leverage×Byld, where Leverage 
is total interest-bearing debt scaled by total assets, measured at the start of the fiscal year, and Byld is Moody's 
seasoned Baa corporate bond annual yield (in percentage). LITA is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
company’s auditor is a big auditing firm (Compustat item #149 between 1 and 8) and if the fiscal year is in a high 
auditor litigation period, and 0 otherwise. High auditor litigation periods are 1967 to 1975, 1983 to 1995, and 2001 
to 2005. LITF is an indicator variable for firm litigation risk that equals 1 if Firm litigation risk is in the fourth 
quartile and 0 otherwise.  Firm litigation risk is a proxy for firm litigation risk defined as the first factor of a 
principal component analysis of five variables: log of assets, beta, stock returns, returns skewness and stock 
turnover. TAXc equals the residuals of a regression of TAX on net income. TAX equals the highest statutory 
corporate income tax rate if the firm has high marginal tax rate and 0 otherwise. TAXu equals 1 if the average over 
three years (t to t-2) of the ratio current income tax (Compustat #16–#50) over tax expense (Compustat #16) is 
between 0.8 and 1.2, and 0 otherwise. REGc is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm pertains to a 
regulated industry (financials and utilities) in years in which there is a decline in the rate of growth of the GDP and 
an increase in the rate of inflation, and 0 otherwise. REGu is an indicator variable that equals 1 if sales deflated by 
(industry total sales/ number of firms in the industry) is in the top quartile and 0 otherwise. UCons is a firm-year 
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proxy variable for the level of unconditional conservatism, estimated as described in the text, constructed so that 
higher values indicate higher level of unconditional conservatism. GOV measures the level of corporate governance; 
it is constructed so that higher values indicate better governance (more board independence and fewer anti-takeover 
provisions). 
The t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the firm and year level (Petersen, 2008), which are robust to 
both heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation. All the p-values are based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 3 
Joint model of all the determinants 
Panel A: Full model  Panel B: Removing M&A activity 
 Coef. t-stat p-val
Adj. R2 
increase 
  
Coef. t-stat p-val
Constant 0.044 6.50 0.00   Constant 0.047 6.60 0.00
D 0.009 1.19 0.23   D 0.008 1.00 0.32
R                        (+) -0.005 -0.87 0.39   R                        (+) -0.008 -1.08 0.28
D*R                   (+) 0.271 7.05 0.00 0.111  D*R                   (+) 0.284 6.70 0.00
LEV 0.003 1.50 0.13   LEV 0.003 1.16 0.25
D*LEV 0.000 0.06 0.95   D*LEV 0.000 -0.18 0.86
R*LEV 0.005 1.62 0.10   R*LEV 0.004 1.54 0.12
D*R*LEV         (+) 0.047 6.39 0.00 0.124  D*R*LEV         (+) 0.047 5.87 0.00
LITA -0.009 -0.76 0.45   LITA -0.011 -0.82 0.41
D*LITA 0.013 1.08 0.28   D*LITA 0.016 1.17 0.24
R*LITA -0.010 -0.38 0.70   R*LITA -0.012 -0.47 0.64
D*R*LITA        (+) 0.233 4.33 0.00 0.134  D*R*LITA        (+) 0.248 4.23 0.00
LITF 0.015 3.66 0.00   LITF 0.017 3.88 0.00
D*LITF -0.012 -2.33 0.02   D*LITF -0.012 -2.07 0.04
R*LITF -0.015 -3.64 0.00   R*LITF -0.015 -3.48 0.00
D*R*LITF         (–) -0.079 -3.09 0.00 0.138  D*R*LITF         (–) -0.074 -2.82 0.01
TAXc 0.001 0.92 0.36   TAXc 0.000 0.78 0.44
D*TAXc 0.001 2.74 0.01   D*TAXc 0.001 2.47 0.01
R*TAXc -0.002 -1.92 0.06   R*TAXc -0.002 -2.28 0.02
D*R*TAXc       (+) 0.011 4.35 0.00 0.149  D*R*TAXc       (+) 0.012 4.53 0.00
TAXu 0.036 6.68 0.00   TAXu 0.035 6.18 0.00
D*TAXu -0.006 -0.92 0.36   D*TAXu -0.003 -0.42 0.68
R*TAXu 0.017 1.80 0.07   R*TAXu 0.021 2.09 0.04
D*R*TAXu       (–) -0.080 -3.50 0.00 0.160  D*R*TAXu       (–) -0.079 -3.32 0.00
REGc 0.013 1.87 0.06   REGc 0.014 2.06 0.04
D*REGc 0.023 1.34 0.18  D*REGc 0.022 1.18 0.24
R*REGc 0.026 1.31 0.19   R*REGc 0.025 1.21 0.23
D*R*REGc       (+) 0.139 1.66 0.10 0.161  D*R*REGc       (+) 0.144 1.61 0.11
REGu 0.007 2.51 0.01   REGu 0.006 2.21 0.03
D*REGu 0.005 0.92 0.36   D*REGu 0.006 0.92 0.36
R*REGu 0.007 2.15 0.03   R*REGu 0.009 2.64 0.01
D*R*REGu       (–) -0.076 -3.62 0.00 0.163  D*R*REGu       (–) -0.078 -3.17 0.00
UCons -0.021 -2.17 0.03   UCons -0.019 -1.96 0.05
D*UCons 0.007 0.67 0.50   D*UCons 0.007 0.65 0.52
R*UCons -0.028 -2.20 0.03   R*UCons -0.027 -2.22 0.03
D*R*UCons      (–) -0.142 -3.87 0.00 0.169  D*R*UCons      (–) -0.146 -3.88 0.00
    
Adj. R-squared 0.169   Adj. R-squared 0.176
N. of obs. 93,838   N. of obs. 79,583
 
The sample contains a maximum of 93,838 firm-year observations corresponding to 10,873 different firms during 
the period 1964-2005. In Panel B, we remove firm-year observations in which mergers or acquisitions (M&A) took 
place. The dependent variable is net income, deflated by market value of equity at the beginning of the period. R is 
the stock rate of return of the firm, measured compounding twelve monthly CRSP stock returns ending three months 
after fiscal year end. D is a dummy variable that equals 1 in the case of bad news (negative or zero stock rate of 
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return) and 0 in the case of good news (positive stock rate of return).  LEV equals Leverage×Byld, where Leverage 
is total interest-bearing debt scaled by total assets, measured at the start of the fiscal year, and Byld is Moody's 
seasoned Baa corporate bond annual yield (in percentage). LITA is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
company’s auditor is a big auditing firm (Compustat item #149 between 1 and 8) and if the fiscal year is in a high 
auditor litigation period, and 0 otherwise. High auditor litigation periods are 1967 to 1975, 1983 to 1995, and 2001 
to 2005. LITF is an indicator variable for firm litigation risk that equals 1 if Firm litigation risk is in the fourth 
quartile and 0 otherwise. Firm litigation risk is a proxy for firm litigation risk defined as the first factor of a 
principal component analysis of five variables: log of assets, beta, stock returns, returns skewness and stock 
turnover. TAXc equals the residuals of a regression of TAX on net income. TAX equals the highest statutory 
corporate income tax rate if the firm has high marginal tax rate and 0 otherwise. TAXu equals 1 if the average over 
three years (t to t-2) of the ratio current income tax (Compustat #16–#50) over tax expense (Compustat #16) is 
between 0.8 and 1.2, and 0 otherwise. REGc is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm pertains to a 
regulated industry (financials and utilities) in years in which there is a decline in the rate of growth of the GDP and 
an increase in the rate of inflation, and 0 otherwise. REGu is an indicator variable that equals 1 if sales deflated by 
(industry total sales/ number of firms in the industry) is in the top quartile and 0 otherwise. UCons is a firm-year 
proxy variable for the level of unconditional conservatism, estimated as described in the text, constructed so that 
higher values indicate higher level of unconditional conservatism. 
The t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the firm and year level (Petersen, 2008), which are robust to 
both heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation. All the p-values are based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 4 
Robustness tests 
Panel A: Information asymmetry control  Panel B: Effect of private debt proportion 
  Coef. t-stat p-val  Coef. t-stat p-val
Constant 0.049 7.12 0.00  Constant 0.093 11.73 0.00
D 0.009 1.21 0.23  D -0.002 -0.17 0.86
R                           (+) 0.014 2.56 0.01  R                             (+) 0.022 1.64 0.10
D*R                      (+) 0.193 6.22 0.00  D*R                        (+) 0.098 2.30 0.02
LEV 0.003 1.56 0.12  LEV 0.001 0.23 0.82
D*LEV 0.001 0.29 0.78  D*LEV 0.002 1.00 0.32
R*LEV 0.004 1.57 0.12  R*LEV 0.004 2.07 0.04
D*R*LEV            (+) 0.050 7.16 0.00  D*R*LEV              (+) 0.055 7.84 0.00
LITA -0.012 -0.95 0.34  PRIVDBT -0.020 -3.06 0.00
D*LITA 0.013 1.14 0.25  D* PRIVDBT 0.004 0.50 0.62
R*LITA -0.010 -0.43 0.67  R* PRIVDBT -0.015 -1.15 0.25
D*R*LITA           (+) 0.232 4.47 0.00  D*R* PRIVDBT    (+) 0.131 3.53 0.00
LITF 0.016 3.78 0.00    
D*LITF -0.010 -2.14 0.03  Adj. R-squared 0.122 
R*LITF -0.013 -4.32 0.00  N. of obs. 68,358 
D*R*LITF            (–) -0.087 -3.40 0.00    
TAXc 0.000 0.81 0.42    
D*TAXc 0.001 2.76 0.01  Panel C: Interaction of LEV with TAX 
R*TAXc -0.002 -2.15 0.03   Coef. t-stat p-val
D*R*TAXc          (+) 0.011 4.45 0.00  Constant 0.068 10.54 0.00
TAXu 0.035 6.48 0.00  D 0.005 0.85 0.40
D*TAXu -0.006 -0.91 0.36  LEV*TAX 0.009 1.60 0.11
R*TAXu 0.015 1.64 0.10  D*LEV*TAX 0.008 1.56 0.12
D*R*TAXu          (–) -0.077 -3.35 0.00  R                             (+) -0.003 -0.37 0.72
REGc 0.011 1.54 0.12  R*LEV*TAX 0.016 2.55 0.01
D*REGc 0.021 1.22 0.22  D*R                        (+) 0.276 6.70 0.00
R*REGc 0.022 1.12 0.26  D*R*LEV*TAX     (+) 0.124 5.15 0.00
D*R*REGc          (+) 0.129 1.55 0.12    
REGu 0.002 0.76 0.45  Adj. R-squared 0.121 
D*REGu 0.005 0.78 0.43  N. of obs. 93,838 
R*REGu -0.004 -0.87 0.38    
D*R*REGu          (–) -0.032 -1.54 0.12    
UCons -0.023 -2.46 0.01    
D*UCons 0.007 0.75 0.46    
R*UCons -0.025 -1.83 0.07    
D*R*UCons         (–) -0.149 -4.30 0.00    
BAS -0.048 -4.73 0.00    
D*BAS -0.001 -0.06 0.95    
R*BAS -0.030 -2.66 0.01    
D*R*BAS            (+) 0.127 4.25 0.00    
N. of obs. 93,067    
Adj. R-squared 0.183    
The sample contains firm-year observations corresponding to 10,873 different firms during the period 1964-2005. 
The dependent variable is net income, deflated by market value of equity at the beginning of the period. R is the 
stock rate of return of the firm, measured compounding twelve monthly CRSP stock returns ending three months 
 53
after fiscal year end. D is a dummy variable that equals 1 in the case of bad news (negative or zero stock rate of 
return) and 0 in the case of good news (positive stock rate of return).  LEV equals Leverage×Byld, where Leverage 
is total interest-bearing debt scaled by total assets, measured at the start of the fiscal year, and Byld is Moody's 
seasoned Baa corporate bond annual yield (in percentage). LITA is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
company’s auditor is a big auditing firm (Compustat item #149 between 1 and 8) and if the fiscal year is in a high 
auditor litigation period, and 0 otherwise. High auditor litigation periods are 1967 to 1975, 1983 to 1995, and 2001 
to 2005. LITF is an indicator variable for firm litigation risk that equals 1 if Firm litigation risk is in the fourth 
quartile and 0 otherwise. Firm litigation risk is a proxy for firm litigation risk defined as the first factor of a 
principal component analysis of five variables: log of assets, beta, stock returns, returns skewness and stock 
turnover. TAXc equals the residuals of a regression of TAX on net income. TAX equals the highest statutory 
corporate income tax rate if the firm has high marginal tax rate and 0 otherwise. TAXu equals 1 if the average over 
three years (t to t-2) of the ratio current income tax (Compustat #16–#50) over tax expense (Compustat #16) is 
between 0.8 and 1.2, and 0 otherwise. REGc is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm pertains to a 
regulated industry (financials and utilities) in years in which there is a decline in the rate of growth of the GDP and 
an increase in the rate of inflation, and 0 otherwise. REGu is an indicator variable that equals 1 if sales deflated by 
(industry total sales/ number of firms in the industry) is in the top quartile and 0 otherwise. UCons is a firm-year 
proxy variable for the level of unconditional conservatism, estimated as described in the text, constructed so that 
higher values indicate higher level of unconditional conservatism. BAS is an indicator variable that takes on the 
value of 1 if the average bid-ask spread of the firm at t-1 is in the top quartile of the distribution, and 0 otherwise. 
The bid-ask spread is defined as the annual average of daily closing bid-ask spread, scaled by the midpoint between 
the bid and the ask. The bid-ask spread is a proxy for the degree of information asymmetry. PRIVDBT is the ratio, 
in percentage, of private long-term debt (Compustat #81 + #83 + #84) to total long-term debt (Compustat #81 + #82 
+ #83 + #84).  
The t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the firm and year level (Petersen, 2008), which are robust to 
both heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation. All the p-values are based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 5 
Robustness tests 
Effect of changes in level of determinants of conditional conservatism  
Xt = β0 + β1 Dt + β01 ∆DETt + β11 Dt ∆DETt + β2 Rt + β21 Rt ∆DETt + β3 Dt Rt + β31 Dt Rt ∆DETt + µt 
 
Panel A: Debt contracting  Panel B: Auditor litigation 
 Coef. t-stat p-val   Coef. t-stat p-val
Constant 0.077 9.51 0.00 Constant 0.076 9.23 0.00
D 0.019 2.65 0.01 D 0.018 2.94 0.00
∆LEV 0.001 0.20 0.84 ∆LITA 0.001 0.06 0.96
D*∆LEV -0.001 -0.28 0.78 D*∆LITA 0.014 1.31 0.19
R                      (+) 0.012 0.88 0.38 R                      (+) 0.017 1.74 0.08
R*∆LEV -0.002 -0.48 0.63 R*∆LITA -0.022 -1.02 0.31
D*R                 (+) 0.419 8.19 0.00 D*R                 (+) 0.404 8.90 0.00
D*R*∆LEV     (+) 0.036 2.27 0.02 D*R*∆LITA    (+) 0.143 2.35 0.02
   
Adj. R-squared 0.112  Adj. R-squared 0.113
 
 
Panel C: High marginal tax rate 
  
Panel D: Regulation, worsening economic 
outlook 
 Coef. t-stat p-val   Coef. t-stat p-val
Constant 0.076 9.44 0.00 Constant 0.077 9.53 0.00
D 0.023 3.23 0.00 D 0.020 2.75 0.01
∆TAXc -0.002 -2.23 0.03 ∆REGc 0.012 0.85 0.39
D*∆TAXc 0.003 5.88 0.00 D*∆REGc 0.430 8.55 0.00
R                      (+) 0.010 0.69 0.49 R                      (+) 0.001 0.18 0.86
R*∆TAXc -0.002 -4.29 0.00 R*∆REGc 0.012 0.71 0.48
D*R                 (+) 0.446 8.88 0.00 D*R                 (+) 0.006 0.29 0.77
D*R*∆TAXc   (+) 0.016 4.72 0.00 D*R*∆REGc   (+) 0.199 2.28 0.02
    
Adj. R-squared 0.146  Adj. R-squared 0.111 
 
The sample contains 58,926 firm-year observations corresponding to 10,873 different firms during the period 1964-
2005. The dependent variable is net income, deflated by market value of equity at the beginning of the period. ∆ 
indicates change from year t–3 to t. R is the stock rate of return of the firm, measured compounding twelve monthly 
CRSP stock returns ending three months after fiscal year end. D is a dummy variable that equals 1 in the case of bad 
news (negative or zero stock rate of return) and 0 in the case of good news (positive stock rate of return). LEV 
equals Leverage×Byld, where Leverage is total interest-bearing debt scaled by total assets, measured at the start of 
the fiscal year, and Byld is Moody's seasoned Baa corporate bond annual yield (in percentage). LITA is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the company’s auditor is a big auditing firm (Compustat item #149 between 1 and 8) and if 
the fiscal year is in a high auditor litigation period, and 0 otherwise. High auditor litigation periods are 1967 to 1975, 
1983 to 1995, and 2001 to 2005. TAXc equals the residuals of a regression of TAX on net income. TAX equals the 
highest statutory corporate income tax rate if the firm has high marginal tax rate and 0 otherwise. REGc is an 
indicator variable taking the value of 1 if the firm pertains to a regulated industry (financials and utilities) in years in 
which there is a decline in the rate of growth of the GDP and an increase in the rate of inflation, and 0 otherwise.  
The t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the firm and year level (Petersen, 2008), which are robust to 
both heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation. All the p-values are based on two-tailed tests. 
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Table 6 
Robustness tests 
Removing from net income the effect of interest and tax expense  
EBITt = β0 + β1 Dt + β01 DETt + β11 Dt DETt + β2 Rt + β21 Rt DETt + β3 Dt Rt + β31 Dt Rt DETt + µt 
 
Panel A: Debt contracting Panel B: High marginal tax rate 
 Coef. t-stat p-val   Coef. t-stat p-val
Constant 0.096 8.88 0.00 Constant 0.190 12.15 0.00
D -0.003 -0.37 0.71 D 0.000 -0.04 0.97
LEV 0.044 10.16 0.00 TAXc 0.002 2.25 0.03
D*LEV 0.002 0.62 0.54 D*TAXc 0.002 1.96 0.05
R                    (+) 0.006 0.44 0.66 R                    (+) 0.044 1.59 0.11
R*LEV 0.019 3.67 0.00 R*TAXc -0.002 -1.47 0.14
D*R               (+) 0.301 7.11 0.00 D*R               (+) 0.407 8.03 0.00
D*R*LEV     (+) 0.048 4.76 0.00 D*R*TAXc   (+) 0.013 4.06 0.00
   
Adj. R-squared 0.180  Adj. R-squared 0.106
 
 
Panel C: Tax-book conformity 
 Coef. t-stat p-val
Constant 0.178 11.02 0.00
D -0.006 -0.52 0.61
TAXu 0.025 2.98 0.00
D*TAXu 0.008 1.08 0.28
R                    (+) 0.042 1.71 0.09
R*TAXu 0.010 0.94 0.35
D*R               (+) 0.417 9.83 0.00
D*R*TAXu   (+) -0.072 -2.73 0.01
 
Adj. R-squared 0.104
 
The sample contains 93,838 firm-year observations corresponding to 10,873 different firms during the period 1964-
2005. The dependent variable, EBIT, is earnings before interest and taxes, deflated by market value of equity at the 
beginning of the period. R is the stock rate of return of the firm, measured compounding twelve monthly CRSP 
stock returns ending three months after fiscal year end. D is a dummy variable that equals 1 in the case of bad news 
(negative or zero stock rate of return) and 0 in the case of good news (positive stock rate of return). LEV equals 
Leverage×Byld, where Leverage is total interest-bearing debt scaled by total assets, measured at the start of the fiscal 
year, and Byld is Moody's seasoned Baa corporate bond annual yield (in percentage). TAXc equals the residuals of a 
regression of TAX on net income. TAX equals the highest statutory corporate income tax rate if the firm has high 
marginal tax rate and 0 otherwise. TAXu equals 1 if the average over three years (t to t-2) of the ratio current income 
tax (Compustat #16–#50) over tax expense (Compustat #16) is between 0.8 and 1.2, and 0 otherwise. 
The t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the firm and year level (Petersen, 2008), which are robust to 
both heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation. All the p-values are based on two-tailed tests. 
 56
Table 7 
Robustness tests 
Portfolio analysis of conditional conservatism determinants 
Panel A: Portfolio summary statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 
CCons (β3) 0.359 0.315 0.063 0.151 0.288 0.458 0.716 
Portfolio no. of obs 372 382 81 146 252 430 840 
Panel B: Pearson correlations 
 Lev LITA LITF Taxc TAXu REGc REGu UC 
CCons (β3) 0.264 0.313 -0.190 0.322 -0.115 0.088 -0.086 -0.273
Panel C: Portfolio regressions; dependent variable CCons (β3) 
  Exp. sign Coef. t-stat p-value
Lev + 0.140 8.73 0.00
LITA + 0.070 4.93 0.00
LITF – -0.045 -3.45 0.00
Taxc + 0.091 6.52 0.00
TAXu – -0.052 -4.06 0.00
REGc + 0.021 1.91 0.06
REGu – -0.113 -8.18 0.00
UC – -0.058 -3.96 0.00
Intercept ? 0.229 14.3 0.00
N. of obs.  247
Adj. R-squared   0.638
The dependent variable CCons, the level of conditional conservatism, is the β3 coefficient estimated by running the 
Basu model for each of 256 portfolios created on the basis of assigning each firm a score on the four determinants of 
conditional conservatism and on the controls for unconditional conservatism, as described in the next paragraph. Lev 
is an indicator variable that equals 1 if LEV (see Table 1) is above the median and 0 otherwise. LITA is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 if the company’s auditor is a big auditing firm (Compustat item #149 between 1 and 8) and if 
the fiscal year is in a high auditor litigation period, and 0 otherwise. Taxc equals 1 if TAXc (see Table 1) is above 
the median and 0 otherwise. TAXu equals 1 if the average over three years (t to t-2) of the ratio current income tax 
(Compustat #16–#50) over tax expense (Compustat #16) is between 0.8 and 1.2, and 0 otherwise. REGc is an 
indicator variable taking the value of 1 in years in which there is a decline in the rate of growth of the GDP and an 
increase in the rate of inflation, and 0 otherwise. REGu is an indicator variable that equals 1 if sales deflated by 
(industry total sales/ number of firms in the industry) is in the top quartile and 0 otherwise. UC is an indicator 
variable for the level of unconditional conservatism that equals 1 if UCons (see Table 1) is above the median and 0 
otherwise. The bias component is a measure of unconditional conservatism estimated as described in the text. The 
regressions report t-statistics based on Huber-White robust standard errors and the p-values are based on two-tailed 
tests. Bold figures in Panel B indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
Based on the scores of each determinant of conservatism, we create portfolios of firm-year observations and run the 
Basu model Xit = β0 + β1 Dit + β2 Rit + β3 DitRit + μit, to obtain an estimate of β3 for each portfolio. For example, we 
classify in portfolio 1 firm-year observations with a score of 1 on Lev, 0 on LITA, 0 on LITF, 0 on Taxc, 0 on 
TAXu, 0 on REGc, 0 on REGu, and 0 on UC; in portfolio 2 we classify firm-year observations with a score of 1 on 
Lev, 1 on LITA, 0 on LITF, 0 on Taxc, 0 on TAXu, 0 on REGc, 0 on REGu, and 0 on UC; and so on. Following this 
procedure, we create 256 (28) portfolios. To improve the robustness of CCons, we remove 9 portfolios that produce 
a negative β3; this results in 247 valid portfolios. Panel A contains the descriptive statistics of these portfolios. 
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Table 8 
Robustness tests 
Asymmetric persistence model: effect of individual  
determinants on conditional conservatism  
ΔNIt = β0 + β1 DΔNIt-1 + β01 DETt + β11 DΔNIt-1 DETt + β2 ΔNIt-1 + 
+ β21 ΔNIt-1 DETt + β3 DΔNIt-1 ΔNIt-1 + β31 DΔNIt-1 ΔNIt-1 DETt + µt 
Panel A: Debt contracting Panel B: Auditor litigation 
 Coef. t-stat p-val   Coef. t-stat p-val
Constant 0.005 3.72 0.00 Constant 0.003 2.67 0.01
D∆NIt-1 -0.004 -2.55 0.01 D∆NIt-1 -0.004 -3.48 0.00
LEVt -0.001 -3.83 0.00 LITAt -0.002 -0.88 0.38
D∆NIt-1*LEVt 0.000 0.29 0.77 D∆NIt-1* LITA  0.002 1.06 0.29
∆NIt-1    0.007 0.67 0.50 ∆NIt-1 0.003 0.37 0.71
∆NIt-1*LEVt -0.005 -1.77 0.08 ∆NIt-1* LITAt  -0.001 -0.07 0.94
D∆NIt-1*∆NIt-1                (–) -0.138 -4.58 0.00 D∆NIt-1*∆NIt-1                      (–) -0.202 -9.98 0.00
D∆NIt-1*∆NIt-1*LEVt      (–) -0.017 -2.21 0.03 D∆NIt-1*∆NIt-1* LITAt    (–) 0.055 1.33 0.18
   
Adj. R-squared 0.020  Adj. R-squared 0.019
 
 
Panel C: High marginal tax rate Panel D: Regulation, worsening economic 
outlook 
 Coef. t-stat p-val   Coef. t-stat p-val
Constant 0.001 1.05 0.29 Constant 0.003 2.15 0.03
D∆NIt-1 -0.003 -2.71 0.01 D∆NIt-1 -0.004 -3.38 0.00
TAXct 0.000 3.87 0.00 REGct -0.002 -1.44 0.15
D∆NIt-1*TAXct 0.000 -2.23 0.03 D∆NIt-1*REGct 0.004 2.31 0.02
∆NIt-1 0.015 1.81 0.07 ∆NIt-1 0.001 0.10 0.92
∆NIt-1*TAXct 0.001 1.65 0.10 ∆NIt-1*REGct 0.016 0.96 0.34
D∆NIt-1*∆NIt-1                        (–) -0.204 -8.84 0.00 D∆NIt-1*∆NIt-1                      (–) -0.176 -7.18 0.00
D∆NIt-1*∆NIt-1*TAXct   (–) -0.002 -2.75 0.01 D∆NIt-1*∆NIt-1*REGct    (–) -0.097 -2.03 0.04
   
Adj. R-squared 0.023  Adj. R-squared 0.018
 
The sample contains 88,887 firm-year observations corresponding to 10,511 different firms during the period 1964-
2005. The dependent variable, ∆NIt, is the change in net income, deflated by beginning-of-period total assets. 
D∆NIt-1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if ∆NIt-1<0, and 0 otherwise. LEV equals Leverage×Byld, where Leverage 
is total interest-bearing debt scaled by total assets, measured at the start of the fiscal year, and Byld is Moody's 
seasoned Baa corporate bond annual yield (in percentage). LITA is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the 
company’s auditor is a big auditing firm (Compustat item #149 between 1 and 8) and if the fiscal year is in a high 
auditor litigation period, and 0 otherwise. High auditor litigation periods are 1967 to 1975, 1983 to 1995, and 2001 
to 2005. TAXc equals the residuals of a regression of TAX on net income. TAX equals the highest statutory 
corporate income tax rate if the firm has high marginal tax rate and 0 otherwise. REGc is an indicator variable taking 
the value of 1 if the firm pertains to a regulated industry (financials and utilities) in years in which there is a decline 
in the rate of growth of the GDP and an increase in the rate of inflation, and 0 otherwise. To reduce the effect of 
outliers, the sample only includes observations in the range -0.2 ≤ ∆NIt ≤ 0.2, which is equivalent to removing the 
top and bottom 2.5 percentiles. 
The t-statistics are based on standard errors clustered at the firm and year level (Petersen, 2008), which are robust to 
both heteroskedasticity and within-firm serial correlation. All the p-values are based on two-tailed tests. 
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Figure 1 
Time-evolution of the Basu (1997) measure of conditional conservatism 
 
 
 
 
Graph of the incremental bad news coefficient β3 obtained from annual regressions of the Basu model : 
 
Xt = β0 + β1 Dt + β2 Rt+ β3 DtRt + µt 
 
where X is net income, deflated by market value of equity at the beginning of the period. R is the stock rate of return 
of the firm, measured compounding twelve monthly CRSP stock returns ending three months after fiscal year end. D 
is a dummy variable that equals 1 in the case of bad news (negative or zero stock rate of return) and 0 in the case of 
good news (positive stock rate of return). The vertical lines mark high auditor litigation periods, defined as 1967 to 
1975, 1983 to 1995, and 2001 to 2005. The annual regressions are based on a sample of 179,985 firm-year 
observations for the period 1963-2005, corresponding to 18,604 different firms. 
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